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Abstract 
This research focuses on analyzing the effects of shifting traffic safety policies within the 
United States. These naturally occurring shifts are examined to determine the effectiveness of 
altering traffic safety policies. Three substantive chapters are presented focusing on different 
policy shifts. Examining the speed limit increase in Kansas reveals that the 2011 increase did not 
result in increased fatality figures; however, it did produce a significant increase in serious 
injuries sustained from crashes. The probable reason is attributed to the increase only affecting 
four-lane divided highways; these crashes are not the deadly head-on crashes but with vehicles 
traveling the same direction at different speed. Studying the upgrade to primary enforcement of 
seatbelt laws in Kansas reveals considerable responsiveness from local law enforcement officers 
when state legislators change the parameters of enforcement. Primary enforcement increases the 
ability of officers to conduct traffic stops while imposing a monetary limit on the citation acts as 
a reduction in profitability for cities. Kansas’ $10 seatbelt citation fine does not even cover the 
cost for municipalities of enforcing the policy, thus cities with managers substantially reduce 
enforcement efforts. Finally, analyzing three distracted driving policies for all states reveal that 
only completely banning cell phone usage while operating a vehicle, for all drivers is associated 
with a reduction in the seriousness of crash outcomes. Policies banning texting while driving and 
novice drivers from using cell phones while driving are ineffective at reducing serious crash 
outcomes. Actually, policies banning teens from cell phone usage is associated with an increase 
in crashes caused by cell phone based distractions. This finding shows the limited long-term 
effects of policies targeting teens, in shaping their behavior in a desirable direction. Overall, this 
project provides statistical support for specific policies that are important for policymakers to 
consider when contemplating shifts in their state’s traffic safety policies. 
iv 
 
Acknowledgements 
 I am pleased to extend my gratitude to those who made this dissertation a reality. These 
individuals have fostered an environment allowing me to develop as a scholar, educator, and 
political scientist. First, I am indebted to my dissertation chair, Donald Haider-Markel, for 
keeping me on track to successfully completing this project. Your insight, assistance, honest 
comments, and feedback have helped me grow as a scholar during this project. Second, I thank 
my committee members, Mark Joslyn, Alesha Doan, Jiso Yoon, and Shannon Portillo for 
continued support throughout this process. The expertise and encouragement you have shown 
inspired and motivated me to complete this project. 
 To my wife and son, Megan and Noah, I am eternally grateful for your support on the 
home-front, filling me with joy, encouragement, and motivation when I needed it. Without your 
sacrifices I would never have finished! To my parents, Margareth and Jan Walther, thank you for 
instilling me with the values and appreciation for education that makes me who I am. Special 
thanks go to my mother-in-law, Vicki, for helping us during the last phase of this project, 
enabling me to finish writing this dissertation.  
 Finally, I am appreciative towards the University of Kansas and the Political Science 
Department for encouraging scholarly development and instilling me with the skills needed to 
become a professional political scientist. Without these experiences and the interactions I had 
with faculty, particularly on a research project for the Department of Defense examining gender 
integration in Special Forces, I would never know that university professors are people too.  
v 
 
Contents 
Abstract .................................................................................................................................................... iii 
Acknowledgements .................................................................................................................................. iv 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction ......................................................................................... 1 
Rationale ................................................................................................................................................... 2 
Research Questions and Significance ....................................................................................................... 3 
Methodology ............................................................................................................................................. 5 
Chapter organization ............................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 2: Killer Speed ....................................................................................................................... 10 
Chapter 3: Bureaucratic Discretion and the primary enforcement of seatbelts ................................... 11 
Chapter 4: The effectiveness of distracted driving policies. ............................................................... 12 
Chapter 5: Conclusion ......................................................................................................................... 13 
 
Chapter 2 - Killer Speed: Analyzing the effects of increasing speed limits on 
Kansas roads. ..........................................................................................................14 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 14 
Background ............................................................................................................................................. 15 
The debate over speed-limits and possible policy shifts in Kansas ........................................................ 16 
Supporters of increasing the speed limit ............................................................................................. 17 
Opponents of increasing the speed limit ............................................................................................. 18 
Implementing the policy shift ............................................................................................................. 19 
Literature review: .................................................................................................................................... 21 
Finding a positive relationship between fatalities and increased speeds ............................................ 21 
Negative relationship between fatalities and increased speeds ........................................................... 22 
No relationship between fatalities and increased speeds .................................................................... 22 
Other considerations and alternative measurements regarding levels of speed .................................. 24 
Research Design...................................................................................................................................... 25 
Data ......................................................................................................................................................... 26 
Methods .................................................................................................................................................. 27 
Results from a Poisson regression modeling fatal-crashes ..................................................................... 28 
Results from a Poisson regression modeling injury-crashes ................................................................... 33 
Discussion and Implications ................................................................................................................... 35 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 35 
 
Chapter 3 - Bureaucratic Discretion: Local LEOs’ Response to State 
Alterations in Enforcement Parameters ..............................................................38 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 38 
Background ............................................................................................................................................. 39 
Bureaucratic discretion ........................................................................................................................... 40 
Research on Seatbelt Laws and Discretion ............................................................................................. 44 
Expectations ............................................................................................................................................ 46 
Research Design and Data ...................................................................................................................... 47 
Variables and Measurement .................................................................................................................... 48 
Methods .................................................................................................................................................. 49 
Models................................................................................................................................................. 50 
vi 
 
Results and Analysis ............................................................................................................................... 52 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 58 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 59 
 
Chapter 4 - Driving Distracted: How effective are state policies at preventing 
distracted driving? .................................................................................................60 
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 60 
Background ............................................................................................................................................. 61 
Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 62 
Other variables of interest ................................................................................................................... 64 
Data ......................................................................................................................................................... 66 
Methods .................................................................................................................................................. 68 
Results ..................................................................................................................................................... 72 
Discussion ............................................................................................................................................... 78 
Conclusion .............................................................................................................................................. 80 
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusion ..........................................................................................82 
 
References ...............................................................................................................92 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables and Figures 
Table 2:1 - Modeling fatal accidents for the 2011 speed limit increase. .................................................... 29 
Table 2:2 - Modeling fatal accidents for the 1996 speed limit increase. .................................................... 31 
Table 2:3 - Modeling injury accidents for the 2011 speed limit increase. .................................................. 32 
Table 2:4 - Modeling injury accidents for the 1996 speed limit increase. .................................................. 34 
Table 3:1 – Count modeling issued seat-belt citations................................................................................ 53 
Figure 3:1 – Number of LEOs and seatbelt citations by local government type. ....................................... 55 
Table 3:2 - Ratio of seat-belt tickets to other citations issued. ................................................................... 56 
Figure 3:2 – Mayors and Managers use of discretion in enforcing seatbelt policy. ................................... 58 
Table 4:1 - Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................................ 69 
Table 4:2 - State Distracted Driving Policies .............................................................................................. 70 
Table 4:3 - Logit modeling cell phone usage as determined to be the cause of crashes. ............................ 74 
Table 4:5 - Multinomial logit model of crash severity with reference to no-injury outcomes. .................. 76 
 
1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 Social regulatory policies are present in nearly every aspect of our daily lives; their 
purpose is to influence individual behavior in a direction deemed desirable by policymakers 
(Tatalovich and Daynes 1988). “Social regulatory policies seek to change behavior that is linked 
to a normative debate concerning the morality of individual actions and the subsequent 
consequences of those actions to the rest of society” (Haider-Markel 1998). Traffic safety 
policies identify undesirable behavior, and attempt to shift behavior with (dis)incentives by 
delivering punishment to offenders that have harmed society through their actions.  
Although many studies have examined how policies are identified, formulated, and 
ultimately passed by Congress at the national and state levels, comparatively little effort has been 
spent on examining how public policy analysis provide an evaluation of implemented policies. 
Theories of policy change, such as the advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Weible 
2007), only addresses the policy process until actors have achieved their desired policy outcome. 
Punctuated-equilibrium theory (True, Jones and Baumgartner 2007) is useful in examining a 
broader spectrum of the policy process; although provisions for positive and negative feedback 
are included the main focus is on how policies change over time. While these approaches are 
large developments on how we explain policy change they do not place emphasis on the 
‘backend’ of the policy cycle where feedback is provided to determine the appropriateness or 
effectiveness of the policies implemented.  
Public bureaucracies are often charged with implementing policies passed by the US 
Congress or state legislatures. Several themes have emerged from implementation research; first, 
development of analytical models, second, the distinction between top-down versus bottom-up 
approaches; third, the attempt to identify important key variables to implementation (Schofield 
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2001). Top-down approaches to implementation has been supplied by many scholars, favoring 
the rationalist public administration model separating policy from implementation, most notably 
Sabatier (1993). However, the implementation process in not linear in the sense that policies 
passed by Congress are implemented by bureaucrats in its intended form (Lipsky 1980). Further, 
policy ‘delivery channels’ are at the heart of implementation studies (O'Toole 1993) and the type 
of organizational structure implementing policies has been uncovered as an important variable to 
the implementation process (Hjern and Porter 1981). How useful is policy analysis in the policy 
process? Although much research has examined policy formulation, passage, and 
implementation there is a lack of congruence in how political scientists view the usefulness of 
the evaluation mechanisms in the policy process. My goal with this project is to show how policy 
analysis is a useful aspect of the policy process and, if results are interpreted correctly, is a 
valuable tool in assessing the appropriateness and effectiveness of social regulatory policies in 
solving the identified policy problem(s). 
 
Rationale 
This dissertation explores the impact of shifts in policies at the state level, and could be 
used as feedback about the effect of these shifts by evaluating them statistically. The 
constitutionally designed vertical division of government power – federalism – provides a prime 
research opportunity for many social issues in the United States since it allows for considerable 
variation. Bureaucrats at different levels of government use their discretion when charged with 
implementing policies directed to them from above. More importantly, do they reevaluate 
already implemented policies? In this dissertation I examine transportation safety policies 
distinct to the state level, and in one chapter how it influences the local level. Policy outcomes 
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are analyzed in an attempt to make inferences about the effects of shifting these policies in a new 
direction. Results from these analyses are then used to evaluate the effectiveness of shifting the 
speed limit in a state; upgrading to primary enforcement of seatbelt compliance; and regulating 
distracted driving. These policies are distinct to their respective levels of government and 
overlapping jurisdiction is non-problematic. The constitution reserves the rights of controlling 
highway policies to the states, enable municipals to enforce compliance with local ordinances, 
and provide a comparative advantage when examining state policies aimed at combating 
distracted driving. Federalism thus provides ample opportunity for research analyzing changes in 
outcomes following policy shifts. 
In this project I examine three different types of public safety policies at the state and 
local level. The chapters are essentially individual studies, where outcomes are evaluated 
following policy shifts, in order to make generalizable predictions about the effectiveness of 
these policies given the identified public safety problem. The studies will rely on available data 
that best addresses different research questions collected under the dissertation’s theme; 
transportation safety. Results from studying the outcomes of shifting these policies will 
complement our theoretical understanding of feedback in the policy process. Evaluating the 
effectiveness of traffic safety policies, by analyzing outcomes of altering these policies, natural 
experiments are introduced to the field of research on the policy feedback mechanism. 
 
Research Questions and Significance 
This examination of traffic safety policies’ appropriateness at the state and local level is 
guided by the following research questions:  
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1. How can policy analysis be a valuable tool in evaluating the effects of policy shifts?  
2. Are local enforcement officers responsive to policy shifts made at the state level?  
3. How effective are state policies aimed at reducing occurrences of distracted driving? 
The potential impact on population groups from policy shifts may pose problems to how the 
interests of these groups are represented by specific policies. If the effects of policy shifts are 
ignored, policies may not mirror the legislators’ original intention or represent the best interest of 
the public. Thus, revising policies based on outcome analysis, affect both the wellbeing of 
citizens and may shift the policy towards its intended purpose. The three policies I examine in 
this dissertation have the potential to impact the lives of nearly all Americans. 
States enjoy reserved powers to regulate highway travel by determining appropriate speed 
limits. Alterations in these regulations pose a potential hazard to state residents and non-state 
residents alike. Many commuters nationwide pass through territory controlled by states they do 
not reside in; therefore, almost all travelers in a region are at risk if increases in speed limits 
results in more fatalities and serious injuries. Municipalities derive authority from state 
constitutions and are charged with enforcing local ordinances. When local law enforcement 
officers (LEOs) are given broader authority to enforce policy compliance they are expected to 
increase the scope of their activities. However, when the state limits the weight of the penalty for 
non-compliance LEOs are able to use discretion to focus enforcement elsewhere. Finally, the use 
of hand held devices has increased dramatically during the past decade and distracted driving 
pose a significant hazard to the public safety. By analyzing various policies states have adopted 
to combat distracted driving, I provide feedback on the effectiveness of these policies given the 
identified problem of distracted driving. In sum, alterations in the proposed policies will impact 
millions of Americans and may disproportionally impact the lives of many minorities. 
Bureaucratic implementation may have further shifted a policy away from its intended purpose, 
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but adjusting policies based on analysis and evaluation may return the policy closer to 
legislators’ original intent. 
 
Methodology 
Few policy studies have employed a quasi-experimental design; in fact, most of 
published research in political science relying on experiments has not addressed any elements of 
public policy. Between 1926 - 2000 only 105 articles have been published, in political science 
journals, where researchers rely on an experimental design; 80 of these were published in five 
journals (Public Opinion Quarterly, Political Psychology, American Political Science Review, 
American Journal of Political Science, and the now defunct Experimental Study of Economics), 
and 94 articles addressed topics unrelated to public policy such as voting behavior, bargaining, 
games, committee work, race, and media (McDermott 2002, 43-45). This lack of reliance on 
experimental approaches makes the public policy area ripe for research employing such a design. 
When analyzing the effects of increases in speed limits, upgrading to primary enforcement of 
seatbelts, and the effectiveness of distracted driving policies I utilize a natural experiment design 
– a subgroup of the larger experimental design. This approach realizes several of the advantages 
associated with regular, “gold standard,” experiments. In the following paragraphs I will address 
the advantages of experiments and some concerns many political scientists have regarding this 
methodology. 
Experimental research designs offer distinct advantages over other methods making this 
approach the “gold standard” for quantitative research. Causality – the ability to confidently 
make causal claims – is the primary motivation for experimentation, and is derived from the 
ability to control recruitment, the assignment to random conditions and treatments, and 
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intentionally produce variation in independent variables (McDermott 2002). These advantages 
assure internal validity – the fact that the experimental treatments make a difference in this 
specific experimental instance (Campbell and Stanley 1963, 5) – which is how experimenters are 
able to confidently make causal claims that variation in one variable produced variation in 
another variable. Many academic disciplines – i.e. the hard sciences – have relied on 
experimentation for decades due to how this approach addresses potential problems inherit to all 
research. 
A major issue for all research designs is how reliable it is; studies that are easily 
replicable increase the reliability of any results. An experimental approach standardizes 
measures, allows for large numbers of measures to be analyzed, and control for any factors that 
might introduce bias in the study, in order to improve reliability (Zimbardo and Gerring 1996). 
Randomization ensures that unknown variation in the subjects’ background is cancelled out when 
researchers have no influence in subjects’ group assignment. Thus, experimenters “ensure that no 
unrelated or spurious factors vary consistently within a given population and therefore bias the 
results” (McDermott 2002, 33). This is useful when comparing between-subjects, as in a 
treatment group compared to a control group. Within-subject examinations also benefits from 
randomization, where time before treatment acts as the control compared to time after treatment. 
Therefore, both cross-sectional and longitudinal designs increase internal validity – the certainty 
that change in X caused changes in Y. However, political scientists are generally more concerned 
with external validity than internal validity (McConahay 1973, 542).  
Political scientists are often concerned with external validity of research as they focus on 
the generalizability of results to other similar cases and situations. Campbell (1968) has outlined 
six threats to external validity. First, it may be difficult to generalize results when subjects are 
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sensitive to the variables being examined. If the study itself increases subjects sensitivity then 
results may be biased and produce an inflated outcome since subjects are more aware than before 
participating in the study. Second, an unrepresentative sample will also produce biased results. 
The classic example would be studies relying on college sophomores as the sample population, 
although sophomores systematically differ from non-sophomores results are inferred on the 
general population (Sears 1986). While an experiment enjoys a high degree of internal validity it 
does not necessarily mean the results are generalizable to other populations. Third, people may 
alter their behavior when observed, a phenomenon called the Hawthorne effect (Roethlisberger 
and Dickson 1939). For example, constant supervision by foremen will change the behavior of 
workers and how they perform their tasks. Fourth, professional participants may be able to 
anticipate the underlying hypothesis examined in the experiment thus skewing the results in a 
specific direction. On college campuses students may participate in several studies at any given 
time thus increasing their ability to detect the elements being tested in an experiment. Fifth, the 
experiment itself could produce spuriousness as a result of subjects providing systematically 
irrelevant responses that are then considered effects of the experiment. Sixth, irrelevant aspects 
of the experiments could produce irrelevant measures that appear to be outcomes of the 
experiment. These six threats to external validity needs to be taken seriously when designing 
experiments, if not addressed they might introduce biased results that affect the generalizability 
of the research findings. Thus, political scientists have relied less on experimental research 
designs than many other disciplines due to the paramount focus on theory testing and 
generalizability of results from one case to another similar situation. Although “external validity 
is only fully established through replication” (McDermott 2002, 40) results from experiments 
may be less applicable outside the controlled confines of the laboratory. 
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The artificially created environment of a laboratory setting – where experiments are often 
conducted – may interfere with any observed outcome(s). Whereas study participants might be 
unrepresentative of the population researchers want to make inferences about, study settings – 
i.e. the laboratory – is unrepresentative of most real world settings. Elections, wars, recessions, 
natural disasters etc. are situations difficult to replicate in a sterile laboratory. However, it may 
be unethical to attempt replication of these situations. Discovering a cure to cancer, AIDS, Ebola, 
or measles would be easier if human subjects were introduced to these illnesses, and then divided 
into control-and treatment groups. Researchers could study the effectiveness of vaccines and 
determine their effectiveness by comparing how many people were cured compared to a control 
group where nobody received a lifesaving vaccine. This scenario is obviously highly unethical 
but highlights a problem with the generalizability of results produced in a sterile laboratory 
setting. Further, study participants may act differently in a setting where outside structures and 
relationships are irrelevant since they cannot be replicated in the experiment (Walker 1976). 
Making decisions in a bureaucratic setting is quite removed from the laboratory, where 
supervisors and consequents are relatively absent. Therefore, experimental designs have been 
less frequently deployed in political science than other disciplines due to concerns over 
generalizability. External validity of study results and the lack of real world relevance further 
exacerbate concerns over the generalizability of results from testing theories and hypotheses. 
Public policy analysis research could successfully deploy variations of an experimental 
research design. When analyzing the effects of increases in speed limits, upgrading to primary 
enforcement of seatbelts, and the effectiveness of distracted driving policies I utilize a natural 
experiment design; also called “field studies” (McDermott 2002), “Nature’s or society’s 
experiments” (Morgan 2013), and “administrative experiments” (D. T. Campbell 1967/1988). 
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This experimental design relies on naturally occurring events outside the control of the 
researcher that are representative and achieves a high level of realism (McDermott 2002, 32). 
Since the researcher lacks control over the variables of interest these types of studies are 
necessarily retrospective and are often organized around “before and after” data to test 
hypotheses. Although there are several different subcategories of natural experiments – four 
according to Morgan (2013) – the three substantive chapters in this project are ceteris paribus 
studies, where all other things are held at the same levels before and after a naturally occurring 
event. This approach realizes several of the advantages associated with regular, “gold standard,” 
experiments. Due to the lack of control over important variables interfering causes and small 
disturbances must be shielded out by the researcher, which is often done through “reverse 
designing” (Morgan 2013, 349). The result is a naturally occurring incident examined as it was 
designed a priori to follow the same chain of events that actually took place. Several studies 
have successfully employed this reverse research design, ranging from the supply of dirty 
drinking water from two treatment plants to find the cause of cholera in mid-nineteenth century 
London (Snow 1855), to explaining transition shocks experienced only by firms in East Germany 
following reunification (Kogut and Zander 2000). Through reverse design researchers are able to 
compare before and after effects of an event and provide meaningful insight into the processes at 
hand. For example, Card and Krueger (1994) put natural experiments on the map for economists 
by studying changes in New Jersey minimum wages and comparing them to other industries that 
did not shift wages. They found that an increase in the minimum wage did not reduce 
employment figures in affected industries. By mimicking the gold standard experiment, natural 
experiments can provide real-world evidence and the results might be more applicable to other 
similar situations than laboratory experiments. 
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Chapter organization 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
This chapter introduces the research questions; the underlying methodology used in the 
three substantive chapters, and discusses the role policy analysis and evaluation plays in 
providing feedback on the effectiveness, thus appropriateness, of a policy. As briefly noted, 
theoretical gaps exists in the literature thereby providing a limited overarching theoretical 
framework ready for adoption in this project. Later chapters will deal with selected policies and 
how outcomes of policy shifts guide our understanding of the effectiveness of such policy 
alterations. They will rely on different theories, where applicable, or examine empirical 
questions that have been unsatisfactorily answered by previous research. Findings from these 
individual studies will guide the contribution of my dissertation to the literature on the 
appropriateness of certain policies given the perceived public safety problem. 
 
Chapter 2: Killer Speed 
In the summer of 2011 authority to set speed limits on Kansas roads devolved to the 
Kansas Department of Transportation. KDOT determined which road stretches were suitable for 
an increase to 75 mph. This study analyzes the effects – of increasing speed limits – on levels of 
fatalities and serious injuries. A Poisson model was used on count accident data from the 2011 
policy shift, and the results were compared to data from an earlier speed limit increase in 1996. 
A positive relationship between travel speed and levels of fatal accidents exists, but the 2011 
shift was not statistically significant. However, travel speed’s relationship with severe injuries is 
positive and significant. For 1996; the relationship between speed limits and fatalities/injuries is 
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positive and significant while the speed limit increase is negatively associated with both fatalities 
and injuries. Therefore, comparing the results from these two events in Kansas, reveal that under 
certain circumstances speed limits may be increased without resulting in significantly higher 
injury and fatality figures. While the speed limit was increased on all public highways in 1996, it 
was only raised on four-lane divided interstates in 2011. Road conditions play a large role in 
determining the seriousness of crash outcomes. Injuries sustained from crashes on divided 
highways are less serious due to vehicles traveling in the same direction but at different speeds. 
Crashes on undivided highways more often results in serious and fatal injuries as vehicles are 
involved in head-on crashes at higher frequencies. 
 
Chapter 3: Bureaucratic Discretion and the primary enforcement of seatbelts 
How do municipal governments respond when the state imposes restriction on local 
enforcement efforts? Previous research on bureaucratic discretion indicates that street-level 
bureaucrats will rely on discretion to alter the distribution of government services and resources 
when principals at the state level signal and alteration in preferences. This study examines the 
number of tickets issued in five Kansas cities for failing to wear safety-belts following a state 
imposed $10 maximum fine and upgrade to primary enforcement. A negative binomial count 
model provides evidence supporting municipal responsiveness to legislative alterations at the 
state level following the upgrade to primary enforcement. Examining the ticket ratio through a 
beta distribution model indicate that officers’ are spending more time enforcing other criminal 
behavior following the statewide maximum fine imposed by state legislators, set at $10, on 
municipal governments. This change in number of tickets issued is attributed to the use of 
officers’ discretion when enforcing the seat-belt law. Additionally, cities with mayor-councils 
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was found to significantly increase the number and ratio of tickets issued for non-compliance 
with the seat-belt law while council-manager cities focus more on the cost-effectiveness of 
enforcement. 
 
Chapter 4: The effectiveness of distracted driving policies. 
Technological developments in communication have revealed itself as a traffic safety 
problem. Distracted driving has become such a large issue that even the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers, representing 11 major car companies, joined the efforts to ban the use of 
handheld devices while driving (Reuters 2009). Studies have shown that distracted driving 
increase the risk of crashing by 23 times compared to non-distracted drivers, and talking on cell 
phones while driving increase your chances of collision by more than 30% (VTTI 2010). 
Between 1999 and 2008 distracted driving resulted in a total of 51,857 fatalities (Wilson and 
Stimpson 2010). More specifically, the increase in texting (SMS) volumes has resulted in 
thousands of additional road fatalities in the states.  
Currently, all states except Montana has some type of handheld device usage ban while 
operating a vehicle (Baumann 2014). This chapter is a comprehensive, cross-sectional 
examination on the topic of distracted driving. Cross-sectional data on the cause of highway 
fatalities are available through the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality 
Analysis Reporting System (FARS). This program collects data from all participating states and 
contains observations from 1975 to 2013, the most recent available data, and identifies if 
distracted driving was the culprit of a fatality. However, only data for 2010-2013 incorporate 
detailed information on the type of distraction(s) a driver experienced immediately prior to a 
crash. Distracted driving policies dealing with restricting texting while driving, teens from using 
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cell phones while driving, and banning cell phone use for all drivers, were analyzed and 
evaluations were made on their effectiveness given the identified policy issue. The only policy 
significantly impacting the occurrence of cell phone distracted driving was policies restricting 
novice drivers from using their phones while driving. Although this relationship was found to be 
significant it was positive, meaning that these policies are not associated with long-term shifts in 
target-group behavior. Only complete bans on cell phone usage for all drivers are effective at 
reducing all type of injuries sustained from vehicle crashes. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
This chapter will discuss the results from the three individual studies and assess the 
overall contribution to the literature. A brief summary of the substantive chapters is provided, 
addressing the research question examined, the data and methods used in the analysis, results and 
discussion. The implications of findings in each chapter are discussed in a condensed format 
compared to this section in the chapters. Obviously, the research designs employed throughout 
this project result in certain limitations. For example, case studies examining conditions in one 
particular case may not be generalizable to other cases that are significantly dissimilar. 
Employing a cross-sectional design increases generalizability but may pay little attention to 
contextual factors leading to limited applicability in a particular case. Although these limitations 
are general and revolve around the research design of this project, it is important to address these 
concerns. 
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Chapter 2 - Killer Speed: Analyzing the effects of increasing speed limits on 
Kansas roads. 
 
Introduction 
Over time road safety has become a growing concern to politicians, infrastructure users, 
and insurance agencies to name a few. Thousands of people lose their lives on the country’s 
roads every year and annually hundreds of thousands sustain injuries from traffic related 
accidents. The economic implications of safety is estimated to cost the country hundreds of 
billions of dollars and the cost increases over time due to increased medical costs, lost earnings, 
and emotional costs from lost family members. Although the National Maximum Speed Limit 
(NMSL) was not intended to reduce fatalities it did cause a reduction in fatality figures. When 
the NMSL was relaxed in the late 1980s and abolished in the mid-1990s traffic fatalities and 
injuries increased nationwide.  
Observing these trends presents the question; why would any state increase the speed 
limit on their roads knowing that higher speeds tend to produce additional fatalities and injuries? 
This study seeks to uncover the rationale for state authorities to increase the speed limit in their 
jurisdictions. First, a background on the debate in Kansas over speed limit is provided and 
stakeholders are identified; second, a review of previous research on the impact of increasing 
speed limits elsewhere follows; third, accident data from Kansas Department of Transportation 
(KDOT) has been analyzed and the results are presented before discussing the study’s 
implication for lawmakers. The push for changes to the maximum speed limit in Kansas 
originated in the state legislature. 
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Background 
Influences external to the issue of passenger safety prompted the passage of the most 
influential highway safety legislation in the 1970s. Middle Eastern oil producing countries 
enacted an oil embargo against the United States in the early 1970s resulting in the adoption of a 
National Maximum Speed Limit (NMSL) of 55 miles per hour in 1974 (Yamane and Bradshaw 
2008). The US Congress effectively took power of setting speed limits away from states and 
made the 55 mph speed limit permanent. Initially Congress wanted to conserve energy by 
adopting a lower speed limit a due to the imposed oil embargo; however, a positive side effect of 
the move to curb gasoline consumption was a decrease in road fatalities from 54,000 in 1973 to 
45,000 in 1974 nationwide (NHTSA-FHWA 1998). In 1987 Congress relaxed the NMSL and 
allowed states to adopt a 65 mph speed limit instead of maintaining the old 55 mph limit on rural 
highways (Balkin and Ord 2001). Congress returned control, of setting speed limits on roads, to 
states completely in 1995 when the NMSL was repealed altogether (Vernon, et al. 2004). The 
earliest relaxation of NMSL only affected rural sections of the interstate system while the repeal 
allowed increased speed limits on all roads without further federal-restrictions. The effect of 
reducing fatalities nationwide was not the intended goal when Congress imposed a national 
speed limit and assessing outcomes of this effect becomes a normative endeavor. However, 
reducing traffic fatalities have major impacts on factors associated with highway travel, family 
life, social settings, and the overall economy. Injuries and fatalities from traffic accidents are a 
terrible strain on society. “Traffic crashes cost the nation about $230 billion each year in medical 
expenses, lost productivity, property damage and related costs. Kansas pays $1.9 billion of these 
costs, amounting to about $700 for every resident of the state, each year” (Aldana 2010). 
Advances in technology have produced ever safer personal vehicles, vehicle accessories, 
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highway and monitoring systems potentially reducing fatalities while there has been a steady 
growth in the number of highway travelers.  
 
The debate over speed-limits and possible policy shifts in Kansas 
Many states opted to increase the speed limits on their roads when this power was 
returned to the states from the federal government, with the repeal of the NMSL, in 1995. Kansas 
increased the maximum speed limit from 65 to 70 mph in early 1996 and from 70 to 75 mph in 
the summer of 2011. Kansas has suffered during the economic recession but lawmakers 
attempted to alleviate economic hardship for businesses with ‘innovative’ public policies. In 
2010 Overland Park Republican Representative Marvin Kleeb pushed for legislation that allowed 
“the secretary of transportation to set the new speed limit on divided, four-lane highways” 
(Hanna 2011). Kleeb argued that shipping companies were bypassing Kansas highways because 
surrounding states allowing for faster transportation through the Midwest due to higher speed 
limits. The Republican was quoted: “It will make us more competitive. There’s a lot of east-west, 
and even north-south options. This will bring business – logistics and distribution business – 
across Kansas” (Hanna 2011). The legislation Kleeb initiated – HB 2192 – passed the Kansas 
House by a107-13 vote and the Senate by a 23-14 margin (Hanna 2011). The bill was signed into 
law by Governor Brownback, and took effect July 1, 2011 (Clark 2011). Only limited access 
rural freeways experienced the increase in the maximum speed limit, totaling 807 miles of road 
including most of Interstate 70 and 35, and US highways 69 and 81 (Rothschild 2011). Kleeb’s 
legislation authorized KDOT to set new speed limits and the agency looked at safety statistics on 
different stretches of freeways before it decided to change any speed limits (Mann 2011). Kansas 
highway 10 was excluded due to heavy congestion said director of KDOT’s Division of Planning 
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and Development, Chris Herrick (K-DOT 2011). The political rationale for the increased 
maximum speed limit in Kansas was to aid the economic recovery as more shipping industries 
relocate their Midwestern trucking routes to the state.  
 
Supporters of increasing the speed limit 
 Politicians hoped that an increase in the maximum speed limit would aid Kansas’ 
economic recovery by creating an incentive for companies to relocate their shipping routes and 
through the state. An increase in travel speed is often correlated with an increase in fuel 
consumption. “The average car is likely to experience a [fuel economy] penalty of 33 percent [at 
higher speeds]” (Energy and Environmental Analysis 2001). When vehicles travel faster tend to 
consume more fuel generally resulting in increased fuel cost for the same distance traveled. The 
Department of Energy claims that “each 5 mph you drive over 50 mph is like paying an 
additional $0.27 per gallon for gas” (fueleconomy.gov 2012). One reason the increase in speed 
limits would aid the economic recovery was that the increased fuel consumption would increase 
the state’s income from fuel taxes (Oberholtz 2011). Increased tax revenue would help the state 
pay expenses incurred during the recession while providing an incentive for shipping companies 
to relocate trucking routes through the state. For the generally Republican leaning state 
government speeding up the economic recovery has been a priority and relaxing government 
regulations on travel speed. However, there are those that object to the increase of speed limits 
from a non-financial standpoint. 
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Opponents of increasing the speed limit 
 The drawback of increasing highway speed limits was the potential increase in road 
fatalities, serious injury crashes, and the direct costs associated with raising the speed limit on 
select stretches of highway. Even Republicans state legislators were split in their view on the 
consequences of raising the speed limit from 70 to 75 mph. “I think when the speed limit’s 70, 
people drive 75 or 80. I think when it’s 75, they drive 80 or 85. We will see an increase in 
fatalities on our highways and we will see an increase in the severity of injuries on our 
highways” said state Senator Vicki Schmidt, a Republican from Topeka (quoted in Hanna 2011). 
Critics of representative Kleeb’s legislation claim several studies had shown that increasing the 
speed limit resulted in a statistically significant increase in fatalities and severe injuries on those 
roads affected by the increase. One study showed that in states where the speed limit was raised 
from 65 to 75 mph the deathrate increased by 38 percent; those states that increased the speed 
limit to 70 mph saw a 35 percent increase in the highway deathrate (Mann 2011). Nobody 
supports legislation that increses the likelihood of fatal accidents. However, supporters of the 
legislation altered the policy image by minimized the negative consequences, and refered to 
studies showing no significant correlation between speed limit increases and increases in fatality 
rates; a study focusing on the 1996 Kansas speed limit increase found no statistical significant 
increase in fatalities and serious injuries on rural roads (Najjar, et al. 2000). Due to the 
uncertainty of the impact of an increase in speed limits on fatalities and injuries opposition to the 
legislation pushed by Rep. Kleeb was weak. Rep. Kleeb forsaw objections to his legislation and 
claimed that none of the 14 other states – that have increased their speed limits to 75 or even 80 
mph – have moved back to pre-increase speeds (Capital-Journal 2011). The core of the argument 
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centered around other states maintaining speed limit increase as ‘proof’ of the neglible impact on 
fatality rates.  
Opposition to the increased speed limit also concerned the cost of the move –potential 
financial and human costs. AAA spokesperson in Kansas – Jim Hanni – said that no group 
opposed the passage of legislation enabling the change in speed limits on highways (Rothschild 
2011). To save cost associated with implementing the speed limit change, KDOT retrofitted 
existing signs with an aliminium insert indicating the 75 mph limit where applicable. KDOT 
estimated the direct cost for new signs to range between $16,000 and $24,000 (Capital-Journal 
2011). Objections to the increase were primarily limited to concerns with a potential increase in 
fatal and serious injury crashes and the financial cost of the move. Besides these concerns there 
were no real political objections over raising the speed limit on Kansas highways.  
There had been public support for the measure for quite some time (Capital-Journal 
2011). However, the outcome of the legislation had the potential to affect any Kansan. Anyone 
who drives on highways with the new speed limit are at risk – either from own fault or from 
other drivers. Novice drivers and male drivers are especially at greater risk of being involved in a 
crash (Bedard, et al. 2002); increasing the speed limit does nothing to mitigate this trend.  
 
Implementing the policy shift 
From an implementation perspective the process of raising the speed limit was simple 
and clear. The legislation pushed by Rep. Kleeb allowed the Secretary of Transportation to 
determine the stretches of separated multilane highways where the speed limit would increase 
(K-DOT 2011). Opposition to this political move was not effective at preventing passage of the 
legislation and politicians gave KDOT the authority to change the speed limits. The legislature 
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signaled that there was majority political support for an increase in the speed limit on certain 
highways. The bureaucracy – KDOT – was charged with implementing the politically favored 
policy change. The process of increasing the speed limit was straight forward; first, KDOT 
determined which stretches of highway could handle an increased speed limit based on safety 
analyses; second, the agency had to implement the change by physically swapping speed limit 
signs; third, informing the public about changes in the speed limit and the highways affected was 
necessary to ensure a safe transition before the July 4th holiday. Under the new legislation the 
agency had the authority to determine the stretches of highway where an increase in the speed 
limit would occur. The agency could have decided to raise the maximum speed limit on all 
highways but limited the change to rural stretches with controlled access and intersections 
because their analysis was based on a variety of technical and safety factors.  
We considered a number of factors, such as traffic volumes, crash history and roadway 
geometrics, to determine where to raise the limit. We will continue to monitor these 
routes under the new speed limit and consider whether it makes sense to increase the 
maximum speed on other highways, said KDOT’S Division of Planning and 
Development director Chris Herrick (K-DOT 2011).  
 
This statement made it clear that the agency will continue to monitor the highways based on a 
variety of criteria leaving the possibility open for future increases in speed limits on other 
highway stretches if deemed appropriate.1  
 
                                                     
1 Conversely, if agency monitoring deems it appropriate to discontinue the 75 mph speed limit on some highways, 
will KDOT revert to a lower speed limit? 
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Literature review:  
Finding a positive relationship between fatalities and increased speeds 
Previous literature examining the impact of changes in speed limits on highway fatalities 
has produced mixed results but is generally divided into two camps. The first group of research 
finds that increases in speed limits – usually from 55 to 65 mph – produces increases in the 
number of road fatalities, injuries, or total number of accidents. Koshal (1976) initially examined 
the capacity of highways in the US and found that introducing a 10 percent increase in the speed 
limit would increase the accident rate per motor vehicle by 4.5 percent. Using structural time-
series modeling for all US states Balkin and Ord (2001) found that the speed limit increases in 
1987 increased rural road fatalities in 19 states at statistically significant levels while the 1995 
change slightly increased rural highway fatalities in 10 states but had no statistically significant 
impact on urban interstates. Ossiander and Cummings’ (2002) Poisson regression model 
indicates that the “fatal crash rate on Washington State’s rural interstates was 110% (95% CI 60-
170%) higher after 1987, when the speed limit was raised to 65 mph, than it would have been if 
the speed limit had not been changed” (15). While Ossiander and Cummings found evidence for 
an increase in the fatality rate an increase in number of total crashes cannot be supported by their 
data. Much of the research showing increases in road fatalities associated with increases in the 
speed limit tends to not extend support to injuries, total number of injuries or frequency of 
crashes. Results from other studies dispute the positive relationship between increasing speed 
limits and fatalities. 
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Negative relationship between fatalities and increased speeds 
A second group of authors finds decreased levels of fatalities, injuries, or total number of 
accidents following an increase in the speed limit. Examining the 40 states that raised the speed 
limit to 65 mph following the relaxation of the speed limit laws Lave and Elias (1997, 615) 
found that the fatality rate decreased 4.68 percent in 1987 and another 1.55 percent in 1988. 
States that did not adopt an increase in speed limits experienced no change in the fatality rate in 
1987 while a 2.55 percent decrease generally occurred the following year. “The difference in 
fatality rates between the two groups of states indicates that the speed limit increase reduced the 
fatality rate by 3.62%” (ibid). All research done in the United States examines increases in the 
speed limit while examinations of speed limit decreases are usually undertaken abroad. 
Johansson (1996, 85-86) found that speed limit decreases reduced minor injuries and vehicle 
damages on Swedish roads while a reduction in severe injuries did not approach statistical 
significance (p=0.17). Even though Johansson found decreasing the speed limit resulted in fewer 
minor injuries this reduction was not significant for severe injuries or road fatalities. Increases in 
fatalities, injuries, and crash figures are sometimes associated with increased speed limits while 
the converse should be true as well; however, until a study – such as Johansson’s – has been 
conducted in the United States this hypothesis is only supported by evidence from abroad. 
 
No relationship between fatalities and increased speeds 
A third group of research that tends to find that no relationship exists or the relationship 
between increases in the speed limit and fatalities, injuries, and total number of accidents is 
inconsistent. Rock (1995) examined rural highways in Illinois following the 1987 speed limit 
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relaxation. His “ARIMA model suggests that around 345 more accidents, 15 more deaths, and 
150 more injuries occur monthly on rural Illinois highways due to the 65 mph speed limit” (212). 
However, Rock does not address the real statistical findings of his model; only increases in 
injuries following an increase in the speed limit achieved statistical significance. His results are 
therefore conflicting with regards to the cause of the increase in fatalities – which he 
acknowledges. Using panel reported data from all 50 states Michener and Tighe (1992) found 
evidence suggesting increased number of fatal accidents following increases in speed limits but 
the results did not achieve statistical significance (456). Yamane and Bradshaw (2008) examined 
the issue from a different angle by employing a case-based case-control design and found 
varying support for different categories of driver deaths.  
For non-collision driver death, the association [between three motor vehicle crash 
categories and driver death] was moderately strong, consistent, and significant. 
Interestingly, the association was stronger for women. For collision with motor vehicles 
in transit driver death, the association was somewhat milder but still consistent. For 
collision with stationary objects driver death, the direction of association was not totally 
consistent (1692-1693).  
 
These results show that there was an association between some categories of crashes and driver 
death but the relationship was inconsistent across all groups of crashes. These results are 
consistent with Vernon et al.’s (2004) findings of increased speed limits resulting in varying 
impacts on fatalities, crashes, and injuries conditioned by road type: rural or urban interstate or 
high speed non-interstate. They conclude that “on both Interstate and non-Interstate highways, 
there was no change in the likelihood of a crash being associated with injury of fatality” (228). 
Results that are mixed or inconsistent appear to trend in certain studies. Mixed results within 
categories of the dependent variable or among the variables under examination will often 
produce statistical evidence that is hard to interpret as it supports conflicting hypotheses. It is 
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worth mentioning that the unit of analysis varies in almost all the referenced research and studies 
range from examining a single state and aggregating results from several or all U.S. states.  
 
Other considerations and alternative measurements regarding levels of speed 
 The importance of investigating changes in speed limits and subsequent changes in 
fatalities, injuries, and accidents stems from the conventional wisdom that ‘speed kills’ (Rock 
1995). Independent variables that may influence fatalities, injuries, and accidents could 
potentially include economic activity, highway design, vehicle design, safety features, seat belt 
usage, alcohol usage, and weather conditions (Calkins and Zlatoper 2001). Most interstates and 
roads where travelers enjoy high speed limits are divided, meaning the major impact on fatalities 
should stem from the variance in speed between travelers. Rodriguez (1990) positively 
associated speed variance with the fatality rate. Whatever the case may be – speed or variance – 
the argument remains that increasing the speed limit will significantly increase roadway 
fatalities, injuries, and the number of crashes. Previous evidence has produced varying degree of 
support for this conventional wisdom; while many US states have increased their speed limits 
several foreign states have decreased speed limits.  
Rationales behind changes in the speed limit often originate with cost-benefit analyses. In 
their cost-benefit analysis Forester, NcNown, and Singell (1984) concludes that reducing the 
speed limit from 65 mph and adopt the 55 mph limit instead would save 7,466 lives per year on 
US highways. In reality such an analysis is practically impossible to implement currently as there 
are 50 different states in control of setting speed limits. Therefore, individual state’s cost-benefits 
are expected to be substantially different than the national cost-benefit analysis for reducing the 
speed limit. For example, western states incorporate vast geographic areas and a reduction in the 
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legal speed limit would increase road travel time in many rural areas; decreasing gasoline 
consumption impacts local economies; and it remains to be seen if drivers actually comply with 
posted speed limits. 
 Why would any state increase the speed limit on their roads knowing that higher speeds 
tend to produce additional fatalities and injuries? Accident data from KDOT was obtained and 
will be analyzed, attempting to find an answer to this question. The goal is to analyze the effects 
of policy shifts, in this case increasing the speed limit on Kansas roads. Based on the results of 
this analysis guidance on the implications of raising the speed limit to 75mph is provided. 
 
Research Design 
Previous research has introduced interesting observations, findings, and conclusions 
about the impact of speed limits on road fatalities. From other studies several hypotheses have 
surfaced and I aim to test the following:  
Hypothesis 1: Speed limits are positively related to levels of traffic fatalities. 
Hypothesis 2: The 2011 speed limit increase in Kansas caused an increase in the number 
of fatal crashes. 
Hypothesis 3: The 1996 speed limit increase in Kansas caused an increase in the number 
of fatal crashes. 
Hypothesis 4: The 2011 speed limit increase in Kansas caused an increase in the number 
of injury crashes. 
Hypothesis 5: The 1996 speed limit increase in Kansas caused an increase in the number 
of injury crashes. 
While I have chosen to investigate the issue from the general theory found in the literature, there 
is statistical support for upward shifts in speed limit policies impacting road fatalities in both 
directions. This theory – that speed kills – is reflected in the above hypotheses and serves as the 
starting point for this study of road fatalities on Kansas highways in conjuncture with the 
relaxation of the speed limit in the summer of 2011. 
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Data 
The data for this study is from the Kansas Department of Transportation; Geometric and 
Accident Data Unit with the Bureau of Transportation Planning. KDOT collects data on many 
types of road accidents and variables related to accidents. Weather, light conditions, time of day, 
stretch of road, type of crash, number of involved vehicles, and direction of travel to name a few. 
The dataset is available from KDOT per request and it is continually updated. Variables of 
interest are number of fatalities, number of injuries, and the speed limit and date where a crash 
occurred. The most recent data – the 2011 dataset – covered the period from January 1, 2010 – 
November 24, 2011, which include the 1 July 2011 speed limit increase from 70 to 75 mph on 
some Kansas highways and sections of the interstates. An older dataset – 1996 dataset – covered 
January 1, 1993 – December 31, 1999 and include the 22 March 1996 speed limit increase from 
65 to 70 mph. The intervention – representing the speed-limit increase is operationalized as a 
dummy variable. Including this variable provide results for how influential the speed limit 
increase was across the range of other variables. The speed limit variable – coded as the real 
value of the limit at the location of the accident – only provide results about the impact of the 
increase from accidents where the limit had been set at 75 mph. Gender is the only demographics 
variable available in the dataset provided by KDOT while information about the location of the 
accident and lighting conditions are available – representing road conditions and externalities 
respectively. Crashes occurring at interchange areas, in intersections, and at intersection-related 
areas were collapsed into the variable accident at an intersection. Non-intersection accidents 
were compiled from accidents occurring at medians, crossovers, and other non-intersection areas 
such as on a shoulder. On interstate accidents is a dummy variable coded 0 if an accident did not 
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occur on a piece of road designated as an interstate, and 1 if the accident occurred at any “I” 
labeled stretch of road.  
 
Methods 
This is a within-comparison where the main focus is death and injuries on Kansas roads 
before and after the speed limit was increased during the 2011 summer. I operationalized these 
variables by relying on the number of fatalities and accidents resulting in injuries reported by 
KDOT; these serve as the dependent variables in the main analysis. Balkin and Ord (2001) 
contest that using fatal crashes provide a more reliable guide to road safety conditions. Since the 
data is represented in regular intervals and the variables of interests are counts of fatalities, 
accidents, injuries, crashes etc., a Poisson-family count model is appropriate when examining the 
relationship between the variables and their impact on road fatalities. Several studies have 
previously employed Poisson count-models successfully (Breslow and Day 1987, Kuhn, 
Davidson and Durkin 1994) because this family of models is based on two assumptions; “i) the 
probability that an event occurs within a small interval of time, Δt, is given by λΔt; and ii) 
occurrences in disjoint time intervals are independent events” (Michener and Tighe 1992, 452). 
A crash on the highway does occur in a relatively short time interval while there is no reason to 
believe that past accidents are related to future accidents. There has been a long history of 
applying this family of modeling to several types of fatality measures. For instance, this type of 
model dates back to 1898 when the Prussian Army modeled deaths related to mule-kicks 
(Michener and Tighe 1992) with the rationale of reducing the likelihood of soldier death; note 
that death as a result from interaction with the enemy was acceptable.  
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The 2011 dataset provided by KDOT consists of 1059 days of observations; 546 days of 
observation prior to the implementation of the speed limit policy shift and 513 days post-
intervention. Between 1 January 2010 and 24 November 2012 a total of 129,652 reported crashes 
took place on Kansas roads. 19,275 were crashes involved injuries to vehicle occupants while 
430 of the crashes resulted in a fatality. Prior to the implementation of increased speed limits the 
total number of crashes was 31,984, where 6,537 resulted in injuries and 293 were fatal. From 1 
July 2011 until 24 November 2012 a total of 97,562 crashes were reported comprised of 12,718 
injury crashes and 137 crashes resulting in at least one fatality. Before and after the policy 
change the maximum number of fatalities in a single day were four and three respectively. 
Maximum daily figures for injury crashes were 63 and 74 respectively. The maximum daily 
figures for total crashes before and after were 313 and 557 respectively.  
 
Results from a Poisson regression modeling fatal-crashes 
 A Poisson count-model was employed when assessing the impact from increasing the 
speed limit on fatalities and injuries. The Poisson regression results (Imai, King and Lau 2007) 
for the 2011 speed limit increase indicate a lack of statistical significance. This finding provides 
some support for lawmakers arguing economics rather than safety, as the rationale for allowing 
KDOT to re-evaluate the speed limit on the state’s divided four-lane roads. Increasing the speed 
limit to 75 mph on certain roads did not by itself increase the number of fatal accidents at levels 
significantly distinguishable from no influence. Similar to previous studies, the limit on the road 
where accidents occur is positively associated with the number of fatal accidents. The magnitude 
of the relationship is fairly small though. Also, this relationship is significant at a high level of 
probability.   
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Table 2:1 - Modeling fatal accidents for the 2011 speed limit increase. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Increase in the speed-limit 0.223 0.173 1.284 0.199 
Speed-limit 0.070 0.008 9.259 0.000 *** 
Number of vehicles involved 0.095 0.016 5.898 0.000 *** 
Gender     
 Female -1.270 0.228 -5.568 0.000 *** 
 Male -1.265 0.242 -5.227 0.000 *** 
Location of accident     
At an intersection 1.446 0.292 -4.951 0.000 *** 
Not at an intersection -1.026 0.236 -4.343 0.000 *** 
In a parking lot -0.754 0.473 -1.593 0.111 
On interstate -1.261 0.163 -7.731 0.000 *** 
Lighting condition(s)     
 Dark and no street lights -1.540 0.717 -2.148 0.032 * 
 Dark but street lights were on -1.298 0.737 -1.762 0.078 ∙ 
 Dawn -1.991 0.783 -2.543 0.011 * 
 Daylight -1.068 0.711 -1.501 0.133 
 Dusk -1.261 0.782 -1.611 0.107 
Constant -5.342 0.891 -5.993 0.000 *** 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 31,179; Psuedo R² = 0.0331 
 
Gender is the only demographics variable available for analysis and provide an 
interesting finding. Both male and female vehicle occupants are negatively associated with a 
fatal crash; however, one has to compare the coefficients when interpreting this result.  The 
relationship between female occupants and fatality as the outcome of an accident is negative with 
a 1.270 coefficient. Compared to men, women enjoy a smaller chance of becoming a fatality 
when involved in vehicle crashes. A variety of explanations could support this finding; overall, 
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women drive less than men, females take shorter trips when driving, and women are not speed 
demons. Whatever the reason for this relationship female occupants are less likely to become 
fatalities when involved in an accident on Kansas roads. 
Examining results for road conditions and externalities – Table 2:1 – important 
information is revealed about what conditions affect crashes in a fatal direction. Crashes 
occurring on the interstate or at non-intersections are negatively related to a fatal outcome. On 
the interstate road conditions are favorable for safety; the design of four-lane divided interstates 
reduces the chance of head-on collision. Crashes between vehicles traveling in the same direction 
but at different speed do not tend to result in a fatal outcome. The same holds for accidents at 
non-intersections for similar reasons. This variable captures accidents occurring on regular roads 
where travel predominantly flows in the same direction. At lower speeds a fatal outcome is much 
less likely when involved in a collision with another vehicle or stationary object. Speed tends to 
be low in parking lots as well and the results in Table 2:1 supports this negative relationship. 
Three variables show a positive relationship to fatalities at statistically significant levels; the 
speed limit, the number of vehicles involved, and whether or not the accident occurred at an 
intersection. 
Results for the 1996 increase in the speed limit provide similar results for the model and 
are based on a higher number of observations. When the speed limit in Kansas was raised from 
65 to 70 mph the number of fatal accidents on the interstate decreased. Table 2:2 depicts the 
relationship between fatal accidents and the variables for the 1996 increased speed limit. Four 
variables achieved significance, two are positively- and two are negatively related to the number 
of fatal accidents. The increase in speed limits seems to have lowered the overall number of fatal 
accidents on Kansas roads.   
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Table 2:2 - Modeling fatal accidents for the 1996 speed limit increase. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Increase in the speed-limit -0.541 0.062 -8.723 0.000 *** 
Speed-limit 0.092 0.004 25.039 0.000 *** 
Number of vehicles involved 0.450 0.023 19.592 0.000 *** 
Gender     
 Female -0.040 0.092 -0.428 0.669 
 Male -0.086 0.105 -0.815 0.415 
Location of accident     
At an intersection 11.403 153.384 0.074 0.941 
Not at an intersection 11.439 153.384 0.075 0.941 
In a parking lot 11.557 153.374 0.075 0.940 
On interstate -1.241 0.074 -16.755 0.000 *** 
Lighting condition(s)     
 Dark and no street lights 0.092 0.339 0.271 0.786 
 Dark but street lights were on 0.105 0.341 0.306 0.759 
 Dawn -0.077 0.369 -0.208 0.835 
 Daylight 0.068 0.335 0.203 0.839 
 Dusk 0.133 0.362 0.366 0.714 
Constant -21.514 153.385 -0.140 0.888 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 144,142; Psuedo R² = 0.0582 
 
Accidents on the interstate are also negatively related with fatalities showing that increasing the 
speed limit from 65 to 70 mph did not result in a greater number of fatal accidents on the 
interstates throughout Kansas. Contrary to the 2011 increase in the speed limit, the 1996 shift 
applied to all appropriate roads in the state. The results in Table 2:2 could be explained as a 
redirection of traffic.  
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Table 2:3 - Modeling injury accidents for the 2011 speed limit increase. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Increase in the speed-limit 0.141 0.039 3.636 0.000 *** 
Speed-limit 0.011 0.001 9.423 0.000 *** 
Number of vehicles involved 0.070 0.005 13.661 0.000 *** 
Gender     
 Female -0.031 0.042 -7.429 0.000 *** 
 Male -0.529 0.050 -10.603 0.000 *** 
Location of accident     
At an intersection -0.162 0.074 -2.198 0.028 * 
Not at an intersection -0.360 0.071 -5.090 0.000 *** 
In a parking lot -0.057 0.105 -0.541 0.588 
On interstate 0.060 0.031 1.928 0.054 ∙ 
Lighting condition(s)     
 Dark but street lights were on 0.704 0.051 13.918 0.000 *** 
 Dawn -0.112 0.090 -1.253 0.210 
 Daylight 0.656 0.040 16.393 0.000 *** 
 Dusk 0.414 0.091 4.540 0.000 *** 
Constant -2.244 0.106 -21.187 0.000 *** 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 31,179; Psuedo R² = 0.0164 
 
Drivers were able to travel on all roads at increased speeds, not only interstates, so the increase 
could have redirected traffic flow away from the interstates in favor of more convenient non-
interstate roads. On the other hand, the speed limit and number of vehicles involved are still 
positively and significantly related to the number of fatal accidents. 
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Results from a Poisson regression modeling injury-crashes 
Applying the same model as for fatal accidents to accidents where the outcome is injuries 
provide similar results but with notable differences. A main difference is the significant and 
positive relationship between the increase in speed limit and the number of injury accidents. 
Interstate travel was negatively related to fatalities – from Table 2:1 and Table 2:2 – and the 
increase in speed limits only applied to divided, four-lane roads. An increase in injury accidents 
may result from designed safety features incorporated into the road preventing fatalities by 
instead increasing injuries. These results provide evidence that the planning and subsequently 
engineering of roads and highway successfully emphasize certain safety elements required by 
law (SAFETEA-LU 2005). Combining the findings of a positive relationship between interstate 
travel and injury accidents – albeit at lower levels of significance – fairly strong evidence exists 
that safety planning has been successfully incorporated into highway designs. When considering 
externalities such as lighting conditions all variables that are significant and show a positive 
relationship with the number of injuries. 
The 1996 speed limit increase’s impact on the number of injury accidents – Table 2:4 – is 
similar to the results following the 2011 policy shift – Table 2:3. The notable exception would be 
that in 1996 traffic shifted towards more interstate travel resulting in greater numbers of injury 
crashes on highways while the overall level of injuries declined. Following the 1996 shift in the 
maximum speed limit data showed an increase in the number of injuries sustained from crashes 
on the interstates but a decrease in the level of fatalities. The shift itself was negatively 
associated with both fatal and injury accidents at significant levels. The results from the 2011 
increase are less consistent, possibly due to fewer observations. 
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Table 2:4 - Modeling injury accidents for the 1996 speed limit increase. 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Increase in the speed-limit -0.104 0.009 -10.930 0.000 *** 
Speed-limit 0.003 0.000 7.825 0.000 *** 
Number of vehicles involved 0.335 0.005 61.559 0.000 *** 
Gender     
 Female -0.004 0.016 -0.234 0.815 
 Male -0.016 0.018 -0.879 0.379 
Location of accident     
At an intersection 0.108 0.152 0.709 0.478 
Not at an intersection 0.112 0.151 0.742 0.458 
In a parking lot 0.110 0.153 0.718 0.473 
On interstate 0.029 0.012 2.384 0.017 * 
Lighting condition(s)     
 Dark and no street lights -0.046 0.056 -0.828 0.408 
 Dark but street lights were on -0.030 0.056 -0.537 0.592 
 Dawn -0.056 0.060 -0.919 0.358 
 Daylight -0.001 0.055 -0.021 0.983 
 Dusk -0.113 0.061 -1.861 0.063 ∙ 
Constant -2.065 0.159 -12.981 0.000 *** 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 144.142; Psuedo R² = 0.0131 
 
The results of these two Poisson models points in the direction that the increase in 
allowed travel speed did not result in increased fatality figures. However, the shift is positively 
related to injury accidents at the conventional level of statistical significance (p=0.05) for the 
most recent policy change but not for the first shift. These diverging results indicate that specific 
stretches of road have an impact on the observed levels of serious injuries. Thus, this study has 
uncovered clear implications for policy makers. 
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Discussion and Implications 
 What should lawmakers take away from this study on their decision to devolve authority 
to KDOT? We know that politicians often devolve authority to a government agency in order to 
show voters, critics, and supporters that actions have been taken to solve a perceived problem 
(Fiorina, et al. 2010). Allowing an agency to re-evaluate the feasibility of increasing the speed 
limit on certain roads insulate politicians from potential harm if the ‘experiment’ does not 
produce a desirable outcome.  Politicians could redirect blame to the agency responsible for 
implementing the law if the shift in speed limits resulted in significant increased fatality and 
injury figures (Bourdeaux 2005, Heiman 1992). Political and economic costs have so far been 
small and potential economic benefits to the state, businesses, and the overall economy remain 
unrealized. The argument is that the incremental increase in the speed limit has been a rational 
political act. Low costs and potential yet unrealized economic benefits are associated with the 
political authorization devolving authority to KDOT for identifying roads suitable for speed limit 
increases. However, in this study I have not been able to examine the impact of the shift in policy 
regarding speed limits on economic activity, state tax income, or business revenues. This 
limitation presents an avenue for further research, preferably after tax reports have been 
submitted to the state. 
 
Conclusion 
 Marvin Kleeb – the main driving force behind the legislation authorizing KDOT to re-
evaluate the maximum speed limit on Kansas roads – argued that increasing the speed limit 
would make Kansas more attractive to the trucking industry by allowing faster transit through the 
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state east-west or north-south. He did not cite research supporting his claim. Opponents of 
Kleeb’s legislation argued that safety would be at risk if KDOT was allowed to raise the 
maximum speed limit. In this study I have presented supporting evidence that there has been no 
significant impact on the number of fatal crashes by increasing the speed limit to 75 mph on 807 
miles of Kansas roads. The previous increase in 1996 also supported a negative relationship 
between increasing the speed limit and the number of fatal crashes on Kansas roads. However, a 
positive relationship between the intervention and injury accidents appeared significant at a high 
level of probability. Vehicles traveling in the same direction on divided roads are at reduced 
likelihood of crashing with oncoming traffic. The policy shift did not have an effect on the 
number of fatal accidents on Kansas roads but was positively related to the number of accidents 
resulting in injuries to vehicle occupants.  
 Examining the 2011 speed limit increase on Kansas roads has shed light on the 
preliminary effect of this policy change. Results indicate that speed kills. This finding is 
consistent across all the models examined although at varying levels of significance. I 
confidently conclude that hypothesis 1 – speed has a positive impact on levels of fatalities – is 
supported by empirical evidence. Hypothesis 2 – the 2011 increase produced more fatalities – is 
not supported. A similar policy shift in 1996 is negatively associated with the number of fatal 
accidents (hypothesis 3). The major finding is inconclusive. Increasing the speed limit in 2011 
may have increased the number of fatal crashes but the results do not achieve statistical 
significance. As for the research questions; does speed kill? The answer is a resounding yes! 
Speed shows up repeatedly as a significant predictor of traffic fatalities. What is the effect of 
increased speed limits on traffic fatalities? The results for the 1996 speed limit increase are 
actually negatively related to the number of fatal accidents. However, the results from the 2011 
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speed limit increase are inconclusive. I cannot confidently reject the null hypothesis based on 
this dataset. 
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Chapter 3 - Bureaucratic Discretion: Local LEOs’ Response to State 
Alterations in Enforcement Parameters 
 
Introduction 
Much of previous research on bureaucratic discretion and policing reveals a tendency to 
focus on specific sections of the relationship between clients and street-level bureaucrats. 
Research examining influences external to this relationship has been limited in scope and often 
focuses on the organizational structure of an agency. Findings indicate that rules, standards, and 
formalized cultures decrease an agents’ flexibility when interacting with citizens. Little of this 
research has specifically dealt with police discretion following state intervention in a policy area 
enforced by local governments. Further, research on intergovernmental relations and the effect of 
federalism on policy enforcement at the municipal level is mostly limited to federal directives 
and Congressional legislation. Therefore, this chapter is organized around providing an answer to 
the following question: are local enforcement officers responsive to policy shifts made at the 
state level?  
Previous research has not provided proper attention to the impact of state level legislation 
on enforcement efforts at the local level or this relationship has been found to be insignificant. 
My project contributes to the literature in two ways; I examine legislative alterations at the state 
level and determine how municipal street-level bureaucrats are responsive to this adjustment by 
their principals; and relying on bureaucratic discretion allow police officers to subsequently 
change enforcement levels of the altered policy. This type of examination is significant as it 
speaks to issues of fairness in and effectiveness of municipal service delivery and since 
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bureaucratic accountability is illustrated by the responsiveness of street-level agents to the 
fluctuating wishes of state-level principals.  
 
Background 
“Wearing a seat belt can make the difference between life and death in a crash, so always 
buckle up on every trip, every time… seat belts save lives, but they only work if you wear them” 
said U.S. Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood (Aldana 2010). Injuries and fatalities from 
traffic accidents are a terrible strain on society; in Kansas, 76 percent of those who die in a traffic 
accident at night are not wearing seat-belts and 57 percent who die from a traffic accident during 
the day are not wearing seat-belts (The Capital-Journal 2012). In May 2010 Democratic 
Governor Mark Parkinson signed the bill into law upgrading enforcement of the mandatory seat-
belt law to primary-enforcement; violations would be punished with $5 fines for the first year 
followed by a doubling the next year to $10 (Koranda 2010). “This bill creates a “primary” seat 
belt law, meaning that a law enforcement officer can stop a car when the officer believes 
someone in the car may not be wearing a seat belt” (Weeks 2010).  
Enforcement of seat-belt compliance most often resides with municipal governments who 
collect fines to fund continued provision of public safety services. How do municipal 
governments respond when the state shifts policies, effectively increase the amount of discretion 
afforded to local law enforcement officers (LEOs)? Subsequently, how do local governments 
respond when the state limits the monetary size of fines municipal governments issue? This 
chapter examines citations issued for violating Kansas’ mandatory seat-belt law before and after 
the shift to primary enforcement. First, I present the concept of bureaucratic discretion and its’ 
connection to seat-belt enforcement; second, a brief literature review of relevant research; third, 
40 
 
data and models along with results are presented; fourth, the implications of primary 
enforcement and state limits on citations are discussed, followed by a conclusion that agents of 
local governments use discretion to respond to state imposed shifts on enforcement efforts. 
 
Bureaucratic discretion 
 The ability of street-level bureaucrats to rely on some sort of professional judgment when 
interacting with citizens clearly impacts the level and quality of government services clients 
receive. Examining local response to state imposed limit on seat-belt fines I rely on an 
established understanding of discretion where “police are required… to decide overtly how much 
of an effort is to be made to enforce specific laws. It recognizes that actions short of arrest may 
achieve the desired goal” (Goldstein 1963, 140). This interpretation of discretion argues that 
police officers have to base decisions on professional standards regarding specific subfields of 
enforcement, such as enforcement of traffic policies. Factors that influence the individual 
officers’ decision-making process compose a critical element of how discretion is exercised with 
regard to lawbreakers. In this paper I argue that local law enforcement officers (LEOs) will alter 
their use of discretion in predictable directions when the state changes local enforcement 
parameters. Officers’ enforcement efforts are made ‘easier’ with the passage of primary seatbelt 
enforcement, and should subsequently increase enforcement of this ordinance. Imposing a 
nominal fee limit on non-compliance should decrease enforcement efforts, as arbitrarily low 
fines do not even cover the cost of issuing them. 
Studies examining bureaucratic discretion often focus on the relationship between street-
level bureaucrats and their clients that is determined by individual characteristics of either actor. 
Some research has expanded on this concept and included organizational factors that may 
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influence bureaucrats to act in a certain direction. Organizational rules and standards limit the 
level of discretion individual bureaucrats are able to exercise and at times these rules and 
standards ensure fairness and equal treatment of clients. However, it is possible that a rigid 
organizational structure discriminate against certain individuals or groups of people because they 
lack specific documentation or other necessities required for benefits. Therefore, allowing for the 
use of discretion could potentially lead to increased fairness and equal distribution of 
government benefits. In turn, the use of discretion effectively established certain public policies 
(Lipsky 2010). 
Bureaucratic activities tend to receive the least amount of public or media attention unless 
their activities violate some form of law or social standard. Actions undertaken by the legislative 
branch dominate the political landscape (Heclo 1994) while unnoticeable bureaucrats determine 
“who gets what, when, and how” (Lasswell 1936). Bureaucrats are often charged with 
implementing policies that have successfully navigated a long political obstacle course. Much 
attention has been awarded to studying the legislative path while comparatively few studies in 
political science have examined the effect of discretion in implementing these policies. As part 
of dealing with the uncertainty of street-level bureaucratic activities, agencies develop rules that 
individual agents then apply in specified situations carrying out policies enacted by legislators 
(Lowi 1969). Bureaucrats effectively rely on their discretion by emphasizing certain elements 
when implementing policies, an inescapable feature of public life (Hawkins 1992), when 
providing citizens with goods and services (Goodsell 1981).  
No study examining the impact of bureaucratic discretion on policy implementation is 
complete without paying credit to Lipsky’s (1980) seminal work; “Street Level Bureaucracy.” 
According to Lipsky, discretion allows government agents room to maneuver. “At best, street-
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level bureaucrats invent benign modes of mass processing that more or less permit them to deal 
with the public fairly, appropriately and successfully. At worst, they give in to favoritism, 
stereotyping, and routinizing—all of which serve private or agency purposes” (Lipsky 1980, xii). 
The ‘continuation’ literature has further emphasized the role of bureaucrats in policy 
implementation: “Indeed those responsible for local authority policy formation have usually been 
practitioners themselves and are well aware that procedures will be ignored or interpreted by 
practitioners who in so doing will themselves formulate policy” (Preston-Shoot 2001, 9). The 
central thesis of Lipsky’s work has been that policy in effect becomes what street-level 
bureaucrats’ make of it. Perhaps even more important, the policy distortions developed at the 
street level are often tacitly accepted by managers as solutions to ‘getting the job done’ when 
faced with real world problems (Lipsky 1980, 18). 
By exercising discretion bureaucrats are able to make an impact on the implementation of 
policy. Several researchers have endorsed a positive attitude towards discretion as a tool for 
more equitable outcomes, allocation of resources where they will do most good, and addressing 
special needs of clients (B. D. Jones 1978, Nivola 1978, Kroeger 1975). Other scholars have 
feared the negative aspects of discretion, a loss of equity, where clients may be denied access to 
benefits, e.g. ‘bureaucratic disentitlement’ (Lipsky 1984, 4-5). Bureaucrats may also discriminate 
against a group of clients due to political pressures or moral reasons (Hasenfeld 1987). Further, 
bureaucratic discretion could be used to undermine the intention of the legislation authorizing a 
policy, thereby working contrary to the wishes of policymakers (Keiser og Soss 1998). 
Movements towards devolution of power from the federal government in the 1990s (Lieberman 
and Lapinski 2001) have made the need for general theories of administrative behavior apparent. 
“Students of public policy require empirically grounded theories that can explain why discretion 
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in the administrative process produces particular outcomes in some circumstances but not in 
others” (Keiser og Soss 1998, 1134). However, public administration scholars might have a 
firmer theoretical grip on bureaucratic discretion’s impact on policy outcomes. Implementation 
studies are located between political science and public administration, two fields that tend to be 
‘polarized’ on this topic (Schofield 2001, 245).  
 Scholars have identified a range of internal factors influencing the use of discretion and 
ultimately the direction of policy implementation. Internal factors include agency rules and 
values and the amount of available resources for consumption and distribution to clients. Street-
level agents may not be familiar with the myriad of organizational rules thereby failing to 
implement them (Brehm and Hamilton 1996). Rules are sometime hard to follow due to an 
agency’s contradictory goals (J. Q. Wilson 1989). Also, bureaucrats show a tendency to ‘pick 
and choose’ what rules to follow when faced with heavy workloads and time constraints (Lipsky 
1980). Further, limited resources make a distributive decision unattractive for bureaucrats who 
may rely on discretion to avoid having to choose among a range of equally ‘needy’ clients 
(Evans og Harris 2004). Similarly, bureaucrats could hide behind discretion in order to protect 
themselves from blame (Parton 2001). 
External factors also influence the use of bureaucratic discretion. Pressure from the 
political environment agents operate in exemplifies external influences on discretion (Keiser 
2001). Similarly, local community groups also influence the use of discretion as they are able to 
petition on behalf of clients (Soss 2000). Research has also been carried out examining client 
characteristics as a factor influencing policy benefits. Keiser, Mueser and Choi (2004) found that 
client race and local racial makeup negatively influence the amount of welfare benefits 
distributed in Missouri.  
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Contrary to the type of research addressed above, some scholars argue that bureaucratic 
discretion is non-existent or marginally influential on policy implementation. This ‘curtailment’ 
literature focuses on the success of managerial control and worker compliance (Howe 1991). 
Studies focusing on managerial tactics of curbing the use of discretion argue that street-level 
bureaucrats have become more compliant as such tactics have become institutionalized as 
mechanisms of control (Langan 2000, Lymbery 2000, Clarke and Newman 1997). Examining 
social workers Jones (1999) argues that “social work has been transformed from a self-regulating 
professional activity into a managed and externally regulated set of tasks” (38). This 
transformation of the bureaucracy has created a “much more mundane and routinized 
relationship with clients which could not be described as social work” (C. Jones 2001, 552). 
However, managerial control of bureaucratic discretion could be rather limited. 
Although these scholars have attempted to downplay the role of discretion in policy 
implementation a vast amount of studies and evidence suggests otherwise. “The proliferation of 
rules and regulations should not automatically be equated with greater control over professional 
discretion; paradoxically, more rules may create more discretion” (Evans and Harris 2004, 873). 
Bureaucrats rely on discretion to complete their tasks in situations where they face uncertainty 
while implement vaguely phrased laws and policies (Handler 1973). The literature on 
bureaucratic discretion indicates a hypothetical if not measurable influence on the 
implementation process. 
 
Research on Seatbelt Laws and Discretion 
Previous studies have determined that compliance with seatbelt ordinances reduce the 
number of traffic fatalities. At the national level (50 states and the District of Columbia) a one 
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percentage increase in the seat-belt usage rate is estimated to save 136 lives; extending this 
relationship implies that increasing usage to 90 percent would save an estimated 1500-3000 lives 
annually (Cohen and Einav 2003, 829). Researchers in Canada found a 17-21 percent drop in 
vehicle-occupant fatalities following the enactment of mandatory seat-belt laws there (Sen and 
Mizzen 2007). Since a significant relationship exists between compliance and fatalities, how are 
states able to reduce traffic deaths? 
Much research has been carried out with regards to the effectiveness of primary 
enforcement of mandatory seatbelt laws. Researchers have found that in states with mandated 
primary enforcement of seatbelt policies compliance tends to be higher (Shults, et al. 2004, 
Dinh-Zarr, et al. 2001). Cohen and Einav (2003, 829) found that “whereas a mandatory seat belt 
law with secondary enforcement increases the usage rate by about 11 percentage points, a 
mandatory seat belt law backed by primary enforcement increases usage by about 22 percentage 
points.” These rates are consistent with the findings of Mujumdar, Noland, and Ochieng (2004) 
who found secondary enforcement to increase seat-belt usage by 9 percent and 16 percent under 
secondary and primary enforcement, while Dee (1998) found usage rates increased 17 and 26 
percentage points respectively. Thus, the type of enforcement has a substantial effect on seat-belt 
compliance rates. “Switching from secondary to primary enforcement increases the [seat-belt] 
usage by about 13 percentage points” (Cohen and Einav 2003, 839). Therefore, the federal 
government has urged states with only secondary enforcement laws to upgrade to primary 
enforcement of seat-belt laws (NHTSA 2004, 1995). Under primary enforcement of seat-belt 
laws the certainty of punishment is greater than under secondary enforcement due to police 
officers’ ability to issue citations for non-compliance without observing any other infraction 
(Houston and Richardson 2006). Lawmakers send a signal to enforcement officers to prioritize 
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seat-belt violations when upgrading to primary enforcement laws that may result in police 
officers issuing an increased number of citations (Russell, Dreyfuss and Cosgrove 1999). 
Consequently, higher levels of compliance should result in fewer traffic fatalities. 
 Primary enforcement of seatbelt laws reduces fatality figures through the mechanism of 
increasing compliance. Few studies actually consider the impact primary enforcement of seat-
belt laws has on the number of fatalities (Houston and Richardson 2006). By examining 9 states 
and the District of Columbia that upgraded to primary enforcement in the 1989-2003 period and 
comparing the results to 14 states with secondary enforcement Farmer and Williams (2005) 
found that such a shift reduced driver fatality rates by 7 percent. Both primary and secondary 
enforcement of seat-belt laws experience a negative relationship with the levels of road fatalities, 
although secondary enforcement reduces fatalities at roughly half the rate of primary 
enforcement (Houston and Richardson 2004, 652) or even less than half as effective in some 
studies (Dee 2001, 120). Regardless of the type of enforcement, the bottom line is that several 
researchers have found lives are being saved by seat-belts (Legge 1990, L. Evans 1986, 
Wagenaar, Maybee and Sullivan 1988). Lives are saved through seat-belt usage and compliance 
is “virtually certain to increase actual usage rates… higher usage, in turn, should imply increased 
highway safety, as reflected in such measures as fatal and nonfatal injury rates” (Asch, et al. 
1991). Increased compliance should lead to safer roads and subsequently reduce fatal and serious 
injury accidents. 
 
Expectations 
 Previous literature on bureaucratic discretion and the concern of local reaction to state 
intervention naturally developed the following expectations. First, by stepping up to primary 
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enforcement the number of citations should subsequently increase. Allowing officers to stop 
vehicle operators due to non-compliance with the law provides an additional tool for 
enforcement compared to secondary enforcement where violations could only be ticketed when 
stopped for other infractions that vehicle occupants were also ticketed for. Second, primary 
enforcement allows for increased emphasis on enforcement of seat-belt violations. If failure to 
wear safety-belt is the only infraction observed officers could not issue tickets for this behavior 
before the upgrade to primary enforcement. Currently, officers are able to issue citations for non-
compliance of the seat-belt law regardless of the presence of other undesirable behavior. Third, a 
reasonable expectation exists indicating that a reduction in the number of tickets issued by local 
law enforcement officers to vehicle occupants for failing to wear their safety-belts will follow the 
state imposed $10 fine ceiling. State actions do not direct local enforcement efforts in any 
capacity other than restricting the amount cities levy against non-compliance of the seat-belt 
laws. Finally, from the discretion literature I hypothesize that police officers use discretion to 
decrease the proportion of time spent on enforcing seat-belt violations following the $10 
maximum fine. The state’s decision to nominally limit this fine indicates – to law enforcement 
officers – that enforcement of this undesirable behavior suffers from low political priority at the 
state level. City level data on the number of seat-belt tickets was obtained from five cities in the 
state of Kansas to test these expectations. 
 
Research Design and Data 
In order to operationalize variables of concern for analyzing bureaucratic discretion – 
specifically the level of police discretion following the change in Kansas seat-belt laws – 
municipal data on the number of citations issued was collected. At times I worked with city 
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police departments while other cities provided these records through their court administration or 
city attorney’s office. These cities included a variety of citation types issued by local law 
enforcement officers within their jurisdictions for 2009 – 2013. For Newton the court 
administrator – Greg Nickel – enthusiastically provided data on citations issued from 1/1/2009 – 
4/24/2013 including seat-belt tickets that was later used to calculated the dependent variable(s). 
Lieutenant Jim Tilton provided monthly citation data for Emporia from 2009 – 2012. Dave 
Wilson from the Lenexa Police Department kindly provided daily ticked data from 1/4/2010 – 
4/7/2013. The county provides policing services for the city of Manhattan – where Kansas State 
University is located – and the records management system supervisor for Riley County Police 
Department – Kari Breault – provided data on number of citations issued within city limits 
during the period 1/1/2002 – 3/31/2013. The city attorney for Leawood – Patricia Bennet – 
provided a nicely organized dataset with citations for the 1/1/2009 – 12/31/2012 period. Figures 
from these five cities were combined into an aggregated monthly dataset ranging from the 
beginning of 2009 to the end of 2012. 
 
Variables and Measurement 
 A number of variables were collected for the purpose of controlling for influences on the 
dependent variable found in previous studies. The Kansas Bureau of Investigation (KBI) 
provides information about the number of police officers working for city governments with the 
exception of Riley County that provides public safety services for Manhattan, KS. Also, KBI 
provides sheriff employment figures for respective counties; these figures were included to 
account for all government agents with jurisdictions enabling them to issue tickets within city 
limits. The gender of the government agent was accounted for both police officers and sheriffs 
49 
 
and provides an important component of the model while addressing the findings of studies 
focusing on the individual characteristics of street-level bureaucrats. Agents of the state – state 
troopers and KBI agents – with authority to issue tickets were excluded as they rarely enforce 
these laws within city limits. Figures for city population in addition to data from the Crime Index 
statistics at the state level were included in the final dataset to account for any variation in the 
states’ general crime pattern/trend. Finally, there is a vast literature on the influence of 
institutional choice on performance of city services; information about the type of local 
government was provided by each city where two cities (Leawood and Lenexa) are led by 
mayor-councils and three (Manhattan, Emporia, and Newton) employ city managers to 
administer daily municipal operations. The dependent variables – seat-belt citations – is a count 
variable and the ratio of these tickets to all other tickets issued within city limits provides the 
operationalized second dependent variable, for the level of police discretion. Upgrading to 
primary enforcement of seat-belt laws in June 2010 Kansas became the 31st state to allow this 
type of enforcement and is represented in the dataset as a dummy variable. The unit of analysis 
in this dataset is city-months and all months after the enactment of primary enforcement were 
coded 1 while all months prior to enactment were coded 0. The same logic applied to the passage 
of a $10 ceiling by state legislators for not wearing seat-belts. Prior to this ceiling all 
observations were coded 0 while post-passage observations were coded 1.  
 
Methods 
 By combining the various dependent and independent/control variables in a single dataset 
I created a multivariate model of changes in police discretion following the upgrade to primary 
seatbelt enforcement and the states passage of the $10 fine limit on these violations. It is 
50 
 
important to realize that the passage of a fine ceiling for lack of seat-belt usage did not change 
the legal interpretation of this behavior nor did it affect the stated level of enforcement desired by 
state law-makers. Police officers and sheriffs were not directed to alter their level of enforcement 
of seat-belt violations in any capacity; lawmakers simply limited the nominal fine violators 
would pay when ticketed. Supporters of the bill claimed it would create legal uniformity across 
the state and thus, ultimately increase seat-belt usage (Associated Press 2010). However, the 
ceiling could potentially alter the cost-benefit of enforcement at the local level as revenues for 
municipal government were restricted while costs of enforcement remained unchanged. Several 
municipal officials publicly criticized the fine ceiling on the basis that $10 would not cover the 
cost of paying an officer to issue the citation nor pay for the cost of processing the ticket through 
local courts (Cooper 2011). I examine the impact of the 2010 state seat-belt enforcement law on 
the number of issued tickets within the 5 city sample and find no significant relationship between 
the fine change and the number of tickets issued by local law enforcement officers. 
 
Models 
 The data on number of seat-belt tickets issued by law enforcement officers within city 
limits qualify to be modeled as count data. Research modeling independent event data – such as 
the number of seat-belt citations – has often relied on count models. Much research on traffic 
fatalities has successfully been based on the family of Poisson count-models (McCullagh and 
Nelder 1989, Frome 1983) due to its simplicity. However, when there is evidence of over-
dispersion in the data negative binomial distributions are favored due to its inherent capabilities 
of accounting for over-dispersed data (Noland 2003).  
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Modeling count variables is a common task in economics and the social sciences. The 
classical Poisson regression model for count data is often of limited use in these 
disciplines because empirical count data sets typically exhibit over dispersion and/or an 
excess number of zeros. The former issue can be addressed by extending the plain 
Poisson regression model in various directions: e.g., using sandwich covariances or 
estimating an additional dispersion parameter (in a so-called quasi-Poisson model). 
Another more formal way is to use a negative binomial (NB) regression (Zeileis, Kleiber 
and Jackman 2008, 1). 
 
Examining the dataset revealed considerable over-dispersion indicating that a negative binomial 
model should be employed to correctly account for the over-dispersed distribution of seat-belt 
tickets. With the statistical program R the Zelig package was used to analyze the city level data 
through a negative binomial model (Imai, King and Lau 2007). Modeling count data with 
negative binomial estimation provides easy and straight forward interpretation of the regression 
analysis; the coefficient calculated for each variable signifies a real increase in the dependent 
variable qualified by the unit of analysis. Table 3:1 indicates a relationship between the number 
of seat-belt tickets and the number of female law enforcement officers that is statistically 
different from no-relationship; meaning that for each additional female officer in the city the 
number of tickets issued for seat-belt violations increased by 0.817 per city-month (the unit of 
analysis). In this sense, the coefficient represents a real and tangible relationship between the 
dependent and independent variable(s). 
 To properly investigate the level of police discretion, following the state imposed fine 
ceiling for a driver failing to wear safety belt(s), a ratio of these tickets compared to all other 
tickets was calculated. This ratio is able to give insight into how law enforcement officers decide 
to spend their time while on duty, i.e. the level of attention officers give to enforce a certain 
illegal activity. Note that this ratio does not include down-time such as time spent traveling to the 
scene of a crime, filing reports, or appearing in court. I assume this amount of an officer’s time 
to remain fairly constant over time and alterations in state law should have no impact on these 
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non-enforcement activities. Seasonal variation could potentially prove a major problem for this 
analysis and is accounted for by the sequence of observations before and after the state upgraded 
to primary enforcement. Conveniently, state law-makers put the law into action mid-summer 
2010 roughly falling in the middle of the seasonal cycle providing a roughly equal amount of 
observations for the before-and after analysis for that year. Further, monthly observations for the 
entire 2009 and 2011 provide additional weight for the periods being analyzed and average any 
seasonal variation throughout a given year. In essence, the observations represent roughly 18 
months of data before and after the upgrade to primary enforcement of seat-belt laws. Similar 
circumstances were present when the $10 fine ceiling went into effect mid-summer 2011; 
sufficient observations before and after – the time point when this law became active – provide 
confidence for the claim that any seasonal variation has been accounted for in the analysis. I rely 
on a beta-distribution model; calculating the ratio of seat-belt tickets to the total number of 
tickets issued would operationally represent police discretion. The results provide statistical 
support for my argument that the level of discretion local law enforcement officer’s use when 
determining to issue tickets for seat-belt violation has been impacted when state legislators 
upgraded to primary enforcement, and later imposed a ceiling on the fine for non-compliance. 
 
Results and Analysis 
 Examining the relationship between the primary enforcement of seat-belt violations and 
later the state imposed fine ceiling to the number of citations issued, provided interesting results 
with regards to the level of police discretion. First, examining this relationship with a negative 
binomial count model shows that upgrading to primary enforcement of seat-belt laws enjoys a 
positive and significant relationship with the number of tickets issued by police for non-
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compliance with seatbelt ordinances. The model and results are depicted in Table 3:1. The 
negative binomial regression results indicate that approximately one additional ticket for seat-
belt violations is issued per city-month; meaning that for the five cities examined, roughly 65 
additional tickets would be issued every year for upgrading to primary enforcement of 
mandatory seatbelt laws in Kansas. 
 
Table 3:1 – Count modeling issued seat-belt citations. 
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Mayor-Commission 54.200 14.253 3.803 0.000 *** 
City Population -0.000 0.000 -2.404 0.016 * 
State Index Crimes 0.000 0.000 3.612 0.000*** 
Interventions     
 $10 seat-belt tickets -0.356 0.273 -1.339 0.180 
 Primary enforcement 1.090 0.237 4.602 0.000 *** 
Law Enforcement Officers     
Male LEOs 0.031 0.073 0.426 0.670 
Female LEOs 0.817 0.215 3.793 0.000 *** 
Male Sheriffs 0.024 0.030 0.790 0.429 
Female Sheriffs -0.896 0.306 -2.925 0.003 ** 
Constant 3.695 0.876 4.216 0.000 *** 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 132; Pseudo R² = 0.07. 
 
Second, the results provide support for the characteristics of individual bureaucrats 
influencing the number of tickets issued. The number of female law enforcement officers and 
female sheriffs with jurisdiction over a city are both significantly related to the number of tickets 
issued at a similar magnitude albeit in opposite directions. Each additional female police officer 
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issue roughly ten more tickets during a work year than their male counterparts, providing some 
support for the impact of differences among individual bureaucrats on the dependent variable. 
Interestingly enough, the presence of female sheriffs results in a negative relationship to tickets 
issued. This could stem from the fact that the actual number of female sheriffs is very low at 15 
percent of the total labor force. The highest number of female sheriffs in the dataset occurred 
during 2012 when 86 female sheriffs were patrolling the cities examined here while there were 
549 male sheriffs at the most during this period. As an explanation, perhaps female sheriffs were 
ordered to patrol remote areas of the county by their supervisors or predominantly issued tickets 
for seat-belt violations outside city limits.  
Third, the data presented here does not reveal any characteristics of the individual clients 
who failed to wear their safety belt and received tickets for this behavior. As the population of a 
given city increases there is a general decrease in the number of tickets issued but the magnitude 
of the relationship is undetectable. Also, it is worth noting that the coefficient representing the 
relationship between the dependent variable and index crimes at the state level is infinitesimal. 
As the general statewide crime index rate increases – calculated from number of murders, 
robberies, sexual-and regular assaults – so does the number of tickets issued but the magnitude is 
very small.  
Fourth, cities under mayor leadership tend to issue much higher numbers of tickets for 
seat-belt violations than their manager counterparts. The dataset provides observations about 
12,778 tickets for failure to wear safety-belts and a total of 111,397 tickets for every type of 
violation. The two cities with mayor-councils – Lenexa and Leawood – were modeled to issue 
1,300 more tickets on average for violating the seat-belt ordinance than cities with manager-
councils. Even though state law-makers imposed a $10 fine ceiling for this kind of behavior 
55 
 
cities with mayors may still ‘provide a certain level of public safety’ responsive to citizens’ 
preferences. Since the cost of issuing these tickets are higher than the revenue they generate city 
managers may instruct police officers to focus their attention on other illegal behavior that is 
more cost-effective to enforce. 
Last, when state legislators imposed the fine ceiling the number of tickets issued for 
failing to wear safety-belts declined; the relationship is negative but statistically 
indistinguishable from no-impact. A variety of factors could influence this relationship and 
combined with the finding on institutional choice I am inclined to argue that a minimum level of 
public safety is required even when enforcement proves unsustainable financially. However, in 
examining the impact of the fine ceiling on police discretion a negative and significant 
relationship emerges. 
 
Figure 3:1 – Number of LEOs and seatbelt citations by local government type. 
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 My argument throughout this chapter has been that police officers with use their 
discretion to alter the level of seat-belt law enforcement following the state’s shift in local 
enforcement efforts. In this section I present support for this argument by relying on a beta 
distribution model; discretion was operationalized as the ratio of seat-belt tickets to all other 
tickets to account for the actual activities officers direct their focus towards while on duty. A low 
ratio indicate that officers are spending a small amount of time enforcing seat-belt violations 
while a higher ratio indicate a higher level of enforcement. The only changes throughout this 
dataset are represented by the state imposed fine ceiling and the upgrade to primary enforcement. 
Table 3:2 represents the results from the beta distribution model.  
 
Table 3:2 - Ratio of seat-belt tickets to other citations issued.   
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-value p-value 
Mayor-Commission 33.730 11.000 3.066 0.002 ** 
City Population -0.000 0.000 -1.306 0.192 
State Index Crimes 0.000 0.000 2.329 0.020 * 
Intervention(s)     
 $10 seat-belt tickets -0.419 0.180 -2.331 0.019 * 
 Primary enforcement 0.589 0.166 3.539 0.000 *** 
Law Enforcement Officers     
Male LEOs 0.070 0.054 1.304 0.192 
Female LEOs 0.451 0.163 2.768 0.001 ** 
Male Sheriffs -0.028 0.022 -1.254 0.210 
Female Sheriffs -0.343 0.225 -1.524 0.127 
Constant -4.060 0.654 -6.207 0.000 *** 
*** pr ≤ 0.000, ** pr ≤ 0.001, * pr ≤ 0.05, ∙ pr ≤ 0.1; N = 132; Pseudo R² = 0.577 
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The $10 uniform fine for violating the seat-belt law imposed by state legislators in mid-summer 
2011 enjoys a significant and negative relationship with the seat-belt citation ratio. Following the 
state passage of this legislation local law enforcement officers are relying in their professional 
discretion to focus their attention on enforcing other types of illegal behavior. Officers may make 
individual decisions that enforcing seat-belt violations are not cost effective resulting in lower 
enforcement or officers may be instructed to focus more on more cost-effective types of criminal 
activity by their supervisors. Although the data does not distinguish between individual or 
hierarchical discretion the results show that some form of discretion exists on the enforcement 
level of seatbelt non-compliance. Future research should obtain highly detailed data to examine 
the distinction between these two types of discretion as a response to state meddling in local 
affairs. 
 The analysis reveals an interesting relationship between cities with mayors and the level 
of seat-belt enforcement compared to all other enforcement. Cities employing managers tend to 
exhibit a lower seat-belt enforcement ratio than mayor controlled cities. In fact, the only cities 
that show the highest ratio are cities with mayors while cities with managers are clustered at the 
lower end of the spectrum. Moving up the range of the ratio the likelihood that cities will have 
managers decrease and the predominance of mayor cities manifests itself. The relationship 
shown by the beta model seems similar to that revealed by the negative binomial count model; 
cities with mayors are continually providing a minimum level of public safety protection despite 
limits on the revenue collected. Manager cities are more likely to focus enforcement on cost-
effective criminal activities by directing attention away from enforcing compliance with seatbelt 
policies and both models presented in this paper support that claim. 
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Discussion 
 Further, imposing a $10 fine ceiling on non-compliance limits the revenues local 
governments are able to collect to fund continued public safety enforcement without impacting 
other policing activities. Cities struggling financially may be more willing to pressure officers to, 
use their discretion to enforce laws that, provide higher economic pay-off for the city treasury. 
The law also signals unwillingness at the state level to prioritize traffic safety for vehicle 
occupants. Rational citizens will realize that a $10 fine is not much and that police officers are 
probably less willing to issue citations for only this illegal behavior when conducting vehicle 
checks.  
 
Figure 3:2 – Mayors and Managers use of discretion in enforcing seatbelt policy. 
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Conclusion 
 This study was aimed at answering the question about how local governments respond 
when the state modifies the parameters of a policy area enforced by municipal officials. Previous 
literature has found a wealth of knowledge in the areas of bureaucratic discretion and agency 
response to alterations in the preferences of principals at the federal level. This study finds 
support that local governments are responsive to their principals at the state level when faced 
with limited autonomy in enforcing mandatory seatbelt policies. Police officers change the 
amount of focus spent on enforcing seat-belt compliance through the mechanism of professional 
discretion. As governmental agents they enjoy vast powers to punish citizens engaged in criminal 
behavior; when the state limits the size of this punishment level of enforcement drops 
significantly. However, this finding does not reveal whether individual officers or their 
supervisors are the source for the shift in enforcement of compliance.  
The influence of electoral representativeness on levels of enforcement is found to be 
positive and statistically significant. Officers in cities employing managers issue vehicle 
occupants fewer tickets for failing to wear safety-belts than officers in cities lead by mayor-
councils. Managers may increasingly focus attention on enforcement of cost-effective illegal 
behaviors while cities where leaders are accountable to citizens provide at least a minimum level 
of public safety. Results from both the negative binomial model (Table 3:1) and the beta 
distribution model (Table 3:2) support this claim; meaning, enforcement levels are conditioned 
by the city’s political institution. This finding speaks to the literature on political institutions 
when parameters are changed at the state level impacting enforcement efforts at the municipal 
level. 
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Chapter 4 - Driving Distracted: How effective are state policies at preventing 
distracted driving? 
 
Introduction 
 Distracted driving has grown to become a major contributor to injuries and fatalities 
figures on public roads in the United States. The number of people killed in vehicle crashes 
caused by distractions increased 6.7 percent from 2012 and included over 3,150 people in 2013, 
while 424,000 receive some sort of injuries from crashes (US Department of Transportation 
2015). Cell phone usage is responsible for 12 percent of distracted driving fatalities and drivers 
who are in their 20s account for 27 percent of the distracted driver of a vehicle involved in a fatal 
crash (NHTSA 2013). The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety reports that drivers spend 
almost 12 percent of their driving-time solely interacting with passengers and 6.5 percent of 
driving-time talking on their cell phone (IIHS 2015). Distracted driving includes talking on a cell 
phone and texting while driving; eating and drinking; interacting with passengers; reading and 
watching videos; using the navigation system and adjusting vehicular controls such as radios and 
air-conditioning systems (NHTSA 2013). Despite this broad definition, the American public has 
made cell phone usage synonymous with distracted driving. Opinion polls show public support 
for state legislatures to address the issue of distracted driving with regulatory policies (New York 
Times/CBS News 2009). Given the growing danger of technology use while driving, it is 
important to inform policy makers and the public about the effectiveness of policies 
implemented to counteract the impact of distracted driving. Due to the lack of research on the 
effect of cell phone restrictions (Kwon, Yoon and Jang 2014, Lim and Chi 2013, Farmer, 
Braitman and Lund 2010) on crashes among the general driving population the Governor’s 
Highway Safety Association encourages states to wait for evidence of effectiveness before 
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adopting cell phone bans (GHSA 2011). It is especially critical to identify the sort of regulatory 
policies that are effective and those that are less effective since they will directly impact peoples’ 
lives. 
 
Background 
 Although the authority to regulate transportation mostly lies with the states, the federal 
government has made combatting distracted driving a priority under President Obama’s 
administration. The national government cannot directly regulate traffic policies in the states but 
is able to do so indirectly through awarding financial incentives to states that enact traffic safety 
laws. Under Secretary Ray LaHood, the U.S. Department of Transportation showed its’ 
commitment to reducing distracted driving by all transportation modes. In September 2010, the 
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) issued texting bans for bus and 
commercial truck drivers and 13 months later completely banned all hand-held device usage for 
these drivers (FMCSA 2011). In 2009, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
restricted all staff from texting during work hours while driving, and from using cell phones 
while driving on personal time if those phones were federally issued (Hersman 2009). As the 
first federal agency to call for a ban on non-emergency use of portable electronic devices for its 
400 employees, the NTSB has also published a number of safety recommendations: the 
enactment of restrictions on nonemergency use of cell phones while driving in all 50 states in 
addition to high-visibility enforcement and a public campaign targeting drivers at risk (NTSB 
2011).  
 Many states have implemented policies that aim at reducing distracted driving; however, 
these policies vary considerably and may not be effective at reducing the problem of distracted 
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driving. New York implemented the first state-ban on hand-held cell phone usage while driving 
in 2001 (New York 2001). In 2007, Washington became the first state to implement a complete 
ban on texting while driving, for all drivers (Washington 2007). Further, Maine and New Jersey 
were the first states to restrict teenagers from using cell phones while driving, in 2002 (Maine 
2002, New Jersey 2002). More recently, in 2013, Hawaii and Florida became the 40th and 41st 
states to ban texting while driving, respectively (Chase 2014). Several states have followed suit 
and implemented regulation on texting while driving and teenager cell phone usage while 
driving, but few states fully restrict the use of cell phones while driving for all drivers. 
 
Literature Review 
 Policies that restrict individual behavior while confined to one’s own vehicle are invasive 
regulations. This fact is evident in the number of states that have implemented policies restricting 
some or all cell phone usage while driving. For example, 35 states and territories had bans on 
texting while driving in 2010; only 10 completely banned all cell phone usage for all drivers the 
same year.  In 2012 those figures were 44 and 12 respectively. These figures indicate that while 
states are reluctant to fully restrict cell phone usage while driving, they are much more willing to 
restrict aspects of hand-held devices. Policies regulating texting bans appear a popular public 
policy for lawmakers in many states as a solution to distracted driving. However, these policies 
only restrict a specific activity of the target population and may not be effective at shaping 
behavior in the long run, nor are they easily enforced. Texting has become almost as common as 
talking on the phone and younger drivers are much more likely to embrace this new technology 
than older drivers (Madden and Lenhart 2009). Knowing this, several states have implemented 
restrictions on texting while driving. However, North Carolina’s policy restricting teenage 
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drivers from using cell phones while driving does not appear to reduce the occurrence of teen 
usage. In fact, one study shows that although South Carolina did not implement a similar policy, 
results from these two states are not statistically significantly different; meaning that the policy 
restricting teen cell phone usage has not produced any long-term shifts in target group behavior 
(Goodwin, O'Brien and Foss 2012). 
Policies restricting teens and novice drivers from using cell phones while driving are 
ineffective at reducing fatalities for this group of drivers. Graduated driver licensing (GDL) 
programs are also ineffective at reducing fatal outcomes for crashes where teens operate vehicles 
(Lim and Chi 2013). While enforcing policies outlawing novice cell phone usage is a daunting 
task for law enforcement in the absence of an age identifier, GDL programs were initially 
effective but have lost their impact over time. Although these policies focus on teens, only 
policies completely restricting cell phone usage for all drivers are effective at reducing fatality 
figures among young adults (Lim and Chi 2013). This type of finding indicate the difficulties of 
enforcing policies that only apply to a targeted group of drivers, and/or display the lack of 
compliance, with these policies, shown by teen and young drivers. Drivers, restricted from cell 
phones based on age, might feel unfairly treated as their older friends and family members drive 
unrestricted 
In 2001 New York implemented a complete ban on the use of hand-held devices while 
driving; it was the first state to enact such restrictive distracted driving policies (Nikolaev, 
Robbins and Jacobson 2010) and few states have followed over the ensuing decade. Examining 
usage figures pre-and-post ban, McCartt and Geary (2004) did not find a statistical significant 
difference in usage as a result of this policy. However, fatality rates in 10 of 62 New York 
counties decreased significantly as a result of this policy while injury rates dropped significantly 
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in 46 of the 62 counties (Nikolaev, Robbins and Jacobson 2010). Before and after results from 
California’s 2008 restrictions on hand-held cell phone use indicate a reduction in fatalities and 
injuries stemming from this policy (Ragland 2012). Further, Kwon, Yoon, and Jang (2014) 
attribute the decreasing trend in cell phone related collisions to policies completely banning cell 
phone use in California. Nonetheless, examining collision claim data from Connecticut, New 
York, California, and the District of Columbia, the Highway Loss Data Institute (2009) found no 
significant influence of policies, banning handheld devices, on trends of collision claims. 
Findings such as these indicate that previous research on the effectiveness of distracted driving 
policies has focused either on cell phone usage or fatal crash outcomes. Therefore, in this study 
both will be examined to provide statistical evidence for the effectiveness of state policies in 
reducing usage and fatalities.  
Considerable research, laboratory simulations and naturalistic observations, has been 
conducted establishing a causal relationship between cell phone usage and distracted driving. 
Evidence supports a strong relationship between distractions, including cell phones, and reduced 
driving safety (Wilson, et al. 2010). Cellular phone use has been linked to elevations in crash risk 
(McEvoy, et al. 2005). However, current research on the effectiveness of distracted driving 
policies has been limited and inconsistent in part because different policies have been examined 
and in part due to the research designs used to study these policies. 
 
Other variables of interest 
Previous studies have determined that compliance with seatbelt ordinances reduce the 
number of traffic fatalities. At the national level (50 states and the District of Columbia) a one 
percentage increase in the seat-belt usage rate is estimated to save 136 lives; extending this 
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relationship implies that increasing usage to 90 percent would save an estimated 1500-3000 lives 
annually (Cohen and Einav 2003, 829). Therefore, drivers who wear seat-belts are less likely to 
suffer fatal injuries if involved in a crash. 
Several studies have examined the impact of speed on injuries and fatalities resulting 
from vehicle crashes. Koshal (1976) initially examined the capacity of highways in the US and 
found that introducing a 10 percent increase in the speed limit would increase the accident rate 
per motor vehicle by 4.5 percent. The relationship between travel speed and fatalities has been 
supported by subsequent studies establishing a strong, positive, and significant correlation. 
 Other characteristics such as driver age, shows a positive relationship with the number of 
road fatalities, meaning as age increases so does the number of fatal accidents (Houston and 
Richardson 2004, Cohen and Einav 2003, Dee 1998). According to the Center for Decease 
Control and Prevention (2015) the leading cause of death for teens in the US is motor vehicle 
crashes. Actually, “the risk of motor vehicle crashes is higher among 16- to 19-year-olds than 
any other age group” (Irons, et al. 2014, 735). Due to the prevalence of fatalities and injuries 
from crashes where teens or young drivers operate a vehicle, many states have implemented 
policies specifically aimed at influencing the behavior of this group. 
While studying the underlying motivation to text while driving, Struckman-Johnson et al. 
(2015) found gender differences affect the type of texting a driver performs. When males’ text 
and drive their messages are often longer, ranging from 1-5 sentences, while women’s messages 
are most often shorter than one complete sentence. They attribute this gender difference to males 
being overly-optimistic about how undistracted they are when texting; however, women are 
more often fearful of the consequences of texting while driving, therefore, they text shorter 
messages than men. Consequently, “we speculate that to the extent that women send short texts, 
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they have a safety advantage in getting their eyes and thoughts quickly back on the road” 
(Struckman-Johnson, et al. 2015, 227).  However, Russo et al. (2014) found that female drivers 
were statistically more likely to use cell phones while driving on Michigan roads. Further, their 
observational study reveals that SUV drivers, weekend drivers, and drivers observed during 
morning or afternoon traffic peaks are more likely to use cell phones while driving. 
Additionally, individual income is negatively related to the number of fatalities (Houston 
and Richardson 2004, Cohen and Einav 2003); this finding may be a result of the relationship 
between wealth and safer vehicles. As income increases individuals are able to spend more of 
their resources acquiring safer vehicles that may ultimately be more effective at saving lives in 
case of an accident. While wealthier individuals purchase newer, larger, and safer vehicles, the 
less wealthy may have to settle for the vehicles they can afford that tends to be older and have 
fewer safety features. However, income is positively associated with fatalities for young drivers 
while high unemployment rates result in less fatal crash involvement for drivers in this age group 
(Lim and Chi 2013). For teens and young adults, income may reflect their ability to acquire 
technological devices and sophisticated cell phones, which in turn distracts their already less 
experienced driving performance. 
 
Data 
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s Fatality Analysis Reporting 
System (FARS) database contains a variety of demographic information associated with crashes 
occurring on public roads in the US. These observations must result in a fatality, recorded when 
occurring within 30 days of the corresponding crash. The database in compiled of information 
collected from emergency medical or coroner reports, hospital records, state registration and 
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licensing files, death certificates, and police reports (Wilson and Stimpson 2010). Witness 
statements, from vehicle passengers or pedestrians, are used when police reports are unavailable; 
however, police reports take precedence when statements conflict (US. Department of 
Transportation 2014). This study examines FARS observations made during the time period 
2010-2012. It is the most recent period available and the first time detailed information is 
incorporated in the dataset, regarding the type of distraction responsible for crashes. Also, this 
period provides considerable variation in the type of distracted driving policies found in many 
states. 
Each crash observation recorded in FARS accounts for demographic information about 
the driver, driver-related factors, vehicle-related factors, and crash-related factors. Additionally, 
observations are made about the type of distraction the driver experienced in the moments before 
a crash occurred. Factors that distracted the operator from the primary task of driving include 
carelessness, emotions, or preoccupation with communication devices. For example, eating or 
drinking, other occupants in the vehicle, smoking, adjusting controls such as air conditioning, 
and cell phones are just some of the distractive factors provided for drivers involved in crashes. 
Demographics include age, sex, race, and licensing status in addition to information about 
previous accidents or driving suspensions. Vehicle-related factors include make, model, and year 
while crash-related factors include variables such as lighting conditions and weather type at the 
time of a crash. Information about the time, day, and month of the crash is also provided. 
State laws regulating the usage of cell phones while operating a vehicle were collected 
from two similar studies. Ibrahim et al. (2011) utilized Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis to create a 
dataset containing laws regulating cell phone usage in the 50 states. Their primary objective was 
to create an open-source dataset to “facilitate future public use of the data set” (Ibrahim, et al. 
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2011, 659). The second study was used to confirm the list of state laws provided by the first set 
of researchers. Chase (2014) provides information about state laws banning texting while driving 
that is consistent with Ibrahim et al. (2011). State laws completely banning the use of hand-held 
devices while operating a vehicle are almost identical. When considering policies regulating 
teenager cell phone usage while driving, the two sources vary slightly for the year state laws 
were recorded as implemented. In this study, Ibrahim et al (2011) provides law data for 
Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Mississippi, Missouri, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and 
Utah. Chase (2014) acts as the source for laws in the remaining states. Combined, these studies 
lay a comprehensive groundwork for how the 50 states regulate driver’s use of communication 
equipment while operating a vehicle. 
 
Methods 
 The main focus of this study is to examine the effectiveness of state policies aimed at 
reducing the frequency of distracted driving and the severity of crash outcomes. While growing 
public awareness of the consequences of distracted driving, and the propensity for young people 
to embrace technology (Madden and Lenhart 2009) make distracted driving policies important 
alone; from a public policy perspective they might be inappropriate given the issue they are 
designed to address. The limited previous research on the effectiveness of distracted driving 
policies has focused either on cell phone usage or (fatal) crash outcomes. Consequently, this 
study will examined both how distracted driving policies impact the frequency of crashes and the 
effectiveness of polices in reducing serious- and fatal injuries sustained in crashes. Many states 
have implemented policies specifically aimed at influencing the behavior of cell phone using 
drivers.  
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Table 4:1 - Descriptive Statistics 2010 2011 2012 
Distracted driving fatalities, no. 20,842 9,048 10,156 
Proportion of all fatalities 31.5% 27.8% 30.2% 
Distracted by cell phone fatalities, no. 736 324 359 
Proportion of distracted driving fatalities 3.5% 3.6% 3.5% 
Proportion of all fatalities 1.1% 1.0% 1.1% 
Driver's gender 
   Male 65.5% 66.5% 66.6% 
Female 34.5% 33.5% 33.4% 
Driver's race 
   Asian 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 
Black 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 
Hispanic 12.7% 12.7% 12.7% 
Native American 1.5% 1.5% 1.5% 
White 70.6% 70.6% 70.6% 
Driver's age, mean. 38.22 38.36 38.56 
Driver's age 
   16-29 32.1% 31.7% 30.8% 
30-49 28.3% 28.4% 27.5% 
≥ 50 30.9% 31.2% 33.6% 
Driver's previous accidents 
   Yes 12.1% 12.4% 12.1% 
No 87.9% 87.6% 87.9% 
Driving alone 
   Yes 53.2% 53.9% 54.4% 
No 46.6% 45.8% 42.5% 
Driving impaired by alcohol 
   Yes 22.3% 21.2% 21.5% 
No 77.7% 78.8% 78.5% 
Type of collision 
   Rear-end 6.2% 6.7% 6.2% 
Head-on 10.3% 10.5% 10.5% 
Other 68.5% 66.9% 67.7% 
Non-vehicular 14.9% 15.8% 15.6% 
Location of crash 
   National Highway System 34.8% 34.8% 34.8% 
State & local roads 65.2% 65.2% 65.2% 
Safety Restraint Used 
   Shoulder Belt 0.5% 0.6% 0.4% 
Lap Belt 2.4% 2.2% 1.7% 
Shoulder and Lap Belt 86.0% 85.7% 86.3% 
None Used 40.6% 39.7% 37.2% 
70 
 
If states aim at reducing usage and crash severity, caused by distracted drivers, they need to 
know the type of policies that effectively reduce cell usage, injuries, and fatalities. This chapter 
introduces two models to bridge the gap in existing literature between research examining usage 
and the studies examining crash outcomes. The first model, results presented in Table 4:3, is a 
bivariate variable where occurrences of distractions by cell phone usage are modeled. The 
second dependent variable of interest for this study is a categorical variable where crash 
outcome; minor injury, incapacitating injury, and fatal injuries are compared to crashes resulting 
in no-injury. The unit of analysis for both models is individual crash observations. 
 
 Table 4:2 - State Distracted Driving Policies 2010 2011 2012 
State Laws, no.    
Texting ban 35 42 44 
Teen cell phone usage ban 32 35 37 
Complete cell phone usage ban 10 11 12 
 
Between 2010 and 2012, distracted driving was responsible for 43.4% of all crashes that 
resulted in fatal injuries. Distracted drivers counted for 38.3% of all serious and incapacitating 
injuries; 38.8% of all minor injuries; 36.6% of all ‘possible’ injuries; while 231,361 did not 
receive any injuries from crashes. Cell phone usage was responsible for 3.54% of all fatal 
injuries caused by distracted driving; 3.52% of all serious/incapacitating injuries caused by 
distracted driving; 3.83% of all minor injuries caused by distracted driving; and 3.45% of all 
‘possible’ injuries produced by distracted drivers. These figures show the true impact of 
distracted driving on fatalities and injuries sustained from crashes on U.S. public roads. 
 Previous studies examining the effects of cell phone usage on driving performance have 
produced an abundance of findings. The main aspect of distracted driving deals with how driving 
performance is affected; reaction time, maintaining lane position, stopping distance or time, 
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following distance, maintaining appropriate speed, complying with traffic signals, appropriate 
steering, and perceived workload (McCartt, Hellinga and Bratiman 2006). In simulated settings 
drivers who were distracted by cell phone usage experienced greater difficulties maintaining 
regular driving performance at higher speed (Shinar, Tractinsky and Compton 2005). However, 
in the real world drivers adjust for the increase in perceived danger from being distracted at 
higher speeds, leading to fewer occurrences of cell phone distractions: 
…blacks and speeding motorists were less likely to be using cell phones. In addition, 
drivers older than age 45 and those with a front-seat passenger were less likely to be 
using cell phones. Cell phone use was also less likely to be observed on weekends and 
late at night, between midnight and 8 A.M (Johnson, et al. 2004). 
The distractive element of cell phones usage is the conversation, impacting thought 
processing, and taking eyes off the road while dialing or texting. Strayer and Johnston (2001) 
found a greater distraction effect of hands-free phone conversation than listening to books on 
tape. Further, Strayer et al. (2005) reports greater effects from both hands-free and hand-held 
phone conversations than from listening to the radio. Drivers who talk on their phones are at 
least four times more likely to miss a highway exit than if conversing with a passenger (Drews, 
Pasupathi and Strayer 2008).  
Additionally, gender and age are contributing factors in maintaining or regaining control 
over a vehicle if engaged in distracted driving. Briem and Hedman (1995) found males to exhibit 
better vehicle control for cases involving both radio and hands-free phone conversations. 
Teenagers (16-18) distracted by cell phones detect far fewer events in front of their vehicle and 
exhibit more lane deviations (Greenberg, et al. 2003). Many factors contribute to a crash when 
drivers experience distractions while operating a vehicle. This study controls for race, age, 
gender, type of distraction, day during week, month, lighting and weather conditions at the time 
of a crash, the presence of alcohol, and whether the driver was speeding. 
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In addition to demographic and event-related observations, vehicle-related factors are 
included in this analysis. The age of a vehicle involved in a crash will likely reflect the state of 
safety technology at the time of manufacturing; meaning, newer vehicles should be safer as 
manufacturers continue to improve safety features. A vehicle’s body type will also play a role 
when it comes to safety. Larger vehicles have room for additional safety systems and the sheer 
size of these vehicles may protect the driver to a larger degree than smaller vehicles. Combined 
these factors could help offset part of the injury-seriousness sustained from crashes caused by 
distracted driving. 
 
Results 
 To determine the connection between certain public policies and the occurrence of 
distracted driving where cell phones usage was the main responsible factor causing a crash, I 
estimated a logit model. The analysis, shown in Table 4:3 reveal that policies, completely 
restricting teenagers from using cell phones while driving, are associated with a significant 
increase in crashes caused by cell phone based distracted driving. This finding is consistent with 
previous research finding little lasting effect on distracted driving of policies restricting teenager 
cell phone usage while driving (Goodwin, O'Brien and Foss 2012). Further, the analysis reveals 
an increased likelihood of cell phone based distractions when drivers are wearing lap or shoulder 
seatbelts. A possible reason could be that drivers’ feel safer while wearing seatbelts and therefore 
engages more in risky behavior. Older drivers are less likely to be distracted by cell phones while 
driving as are males. Operating older vehicles decreases the likelihood a driver will be distracted 
by cell phone usage; however, conventional levels of statistical significance were not reached. A 
possible reason for this decreased likelihood could indicate that drivers of older vehicles do not 
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have the means to acquire and/or use cell phones, their cell phones are harder to manipulate 
while driving, or these drivers over-compensate knowing that their vehicles are less safe than 
newer models. The analysis indicate that exceeding the speed limit (measured by the real miles 
per hour in excess of the limit), is a significant determining factor for drivers to experience cell 
phone base distractions. However, this revelation is inconsistent with research finding fewer cell 
phone distractions at high speeds (Johnson, et al. 2004).  
Interestingly, a significant likelihood exists between cell phone distractions and single 
drivers. The likelihood is similar for drivers with passengers in both the front and rear seats 
(many passengers). These results are consistent with previous research finding support for only 
front-seat passengers intervening when drivers are using cell phones, resulting in fewer 
occurrences of distracted driving. These coefficients do not reach a conventional statistical 
significance level, but are significant at 0.1 levels of probability. 
In order to examine the effectiveness of public policies, aimed at reducing the impact of 
distracted driving on public roads, several control variables were included in the model in 
addition to dummy variables representing each state with the corresponding laws. A majority of 
states have enacted policies banning texting while driving. Compared to other policies this is the 
least restrictive while a complete ban on cell phone usage while driving is considered the most 
invasive policy. A policy banning teenagers or novice drivers from using cell phones while 
operating a vehicle falls short of the invasiveness of a complete ban but is more invasive than 
bans on texting while driving for this target-group. As these policies become more invasive the 
number of states with these policies decline. For example, as depicted in Table 4:2, 35 states and 
territories had bans on texting while driving in 2010; only 10 completely banned all cell phone 
usage for all type of drivers the same year.  In 2012 those figures were 44 and 12 respectively.   
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Table 4:3 - Logit modeling cell phone usage as determined to be the cause of crashes. 
Variables: Estimate Std. Error z-value p-value 
Policy:     
Text Ban 0.079 0.119 0.67 0.503 
Teen Ban 0.434 0.118 3.678 0.000*** 
Usage Ban -0.111 0.111 -0.999 0.318 
     
Race:     
Asian -11.580 158.000 -0.073 0.942 
Black 0.005 0.179 0.029 0.977 
Hispanic -0.382 0.232 -1.647 0.099+ 
Native American 0.482 0.387 1.244 0.213 
Pacific Islander -0.067 0.713 -0.095 0.924 
White 0.170 0.095 1.791 0.073+ 
     
Vehicle occupants:     
Driver only 1.936 1.004 1.929 0.054+ 
Driver and front passenger(s) 1.521 1.006 1.512 0.131 
Driver and many passengers 1.682 1.006 1.672 0.095+ 
     
Restraint type:     
Lap or shoulder belt 0.950 0.333 2.856 0.004** 
Lap and Shoulder 0.527 0.262 2.009 0.044* 
Other restraint -0.599 0.390 -1.540 0.124 
No restraint 0.588 0.261 2.255 0.024* 
     
Age of driver -0.017 0.002 -7.299 0.000*** 
Males -0.497 0.076 -6.500 0.000*** 
Vehicle age -0.011 0.006 -1.693 0.000+ 
Exceeding speed limit 0.004 0.000 4.475 0.000*** 
     
(Intercept) -6.932 1.039 -6.674 0.000*** 
+ p ≤ 0.1, * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001, N = 300,224 
Source: FARS Data 
 
 
Policies regulating texting bans appear a popular public policy for lawmakers in many 
states as a solution to the problem of distracted driving. Possible reasons for this observation 
might be that elected officials are unable to enact legislation that is most invasive while 
appearing to take the issue serious when implementing less invasive distracted driving policies. 
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The effectiveness of distracted policies might be another concern to policymakers. Limited 
academic research in this area could be a reason why few states have adopted these policies.  
The calculative impact of distractive driving lies with the ability to measure adverse effects on 
the human body. In this case, crash outcomes of no-injury, minor injuries, major injuries, and 
fatalities acts as the dependent variable. As the unit of analysis is individual crashes, the 
dependent variable is organized as a categorical variable with three possible crash outcomes 
compared to the baseline of no-injury sustained. Other variables of interest are coded according 
to the FARS handbook, and are in some cases simplified. For example, all subgroups of 
Hispanics are coded as such, including Cubans, Mexicans, Puerto Rican and Central or South 
America. Those of Asian heritage are coded as such, including Japanese, Chinese, Korean, and 
Vietnamese. Where possible the travel speed at crash-time has been compared to the posted 
speed limit to create a variable measuring the level of speeding a driver engaged in immediately 
prior to the crash. In addition to demographics, these variables are included to account for results 
from a variety of previous research and to empirically support this study’s contribution to the 
limited body of research on the effectiveness of policies regulating distracted driving. 
 Table 4:5 show results from the multinomial logit regression of injury seriousness 
modeled by a variety of independent variables; crashes resulting in no-injuries acts as the 
reference category. Values with a * indicate a significant p-value with a two-tailed significance 
test while values with a + indicate significant p-values with one-tailed significance test. The only 
state policy that appears to have an impact on all types of crash injuries is the complete ban on 
hand-held device usage while driving. State policies, banning cell phone usage for all drivers, 
reduce the likelihood of crashes where the outcome is a serious or fatal injury.   
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Table 4:4 - Multinomial logit model of crash severity with reference to no-injury outcomes. 
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The z-value for this coefficient is noticeably large indicating a strong impact of these policies on 
the seriousness of crash outcomes. Unexpectedly, cell phone based distracted driving is not a 
significant factor in determining the severity of crash outcomes. Drivers’ who exceed the speed 
limit are at increased likelihood to experience distractions from cell phones. Speeding results in 
fewer minor and incapacitating injuries but this coefficient is not significant for fatal injuries, 
meaning the effect of speeding on fatal injuries is undetermined. Although the coefficient is 
statistically significant, it is very small per mile per hour exceeding the posted speed limit. Other 
restraints, such as child restraints and motor cycle helmets reveal a similar impact on crash 
outcomes as speeding. Race is the last variable revealed as a significant predictor. Black drivers 
are less likely to receive minor and major injuries following a crash but the coefficient is not 
significant for fatal injuries. It appears that black drivers are disproportionally involved in 
crashes that result in fatal injuries. White drivers are more likely to receive major injuries than 
minor or fatal injuries in a crash. These results empirically support state policies that completely 
ban the usage of hand-held devices while operating a vehicle. Other policies, such as texting 
bans and restricting teenagers from using cell phones while driving, are not effective at 
preventing bodily harm as measured by crash outcomes. This is a clear message that simply 
enacting these types of policies will not solve the problem of distracted driving. A complete 
usage ban followed by a public awareness campaign and rigorous enforcement2 is the most 
effective policy when seeking to reduce the bodily-harm produced by distracted driving. 
 Several variables show insignificant coefficients with the dependent variable, crash 
outcomes. The interpretation focuses on their lack of significant contributions to minor, 
                                                     
2 Public awareness and enforcement levels are recommended by the National Transportation Safety Board (2011) to 
complement complete cell phone usage ban, increasing effectiveness. 
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incapacitating, and fatal injuries respectively. Policies aimed at reducing distracted driving that 
focus on restricting texting for all drivers and restricting teenagers from using cell phones while 
driving are not effective at reducing any type of injury sustained in a crash. Racial background of 
the driver varies significantly with large margins of error, except for black and white drivers. The 
standard errors for modeling Asian, Hispanic, Native Americans, and Pacific Islanders are very 
large which might indicate that few crashes result in injuries/fatalities with drivers from these 
racial backgrounds. Whereas driving alone or with many passengers cause distractions, none of 
the vehicle occupant categories are significant predictors of the severity of crash outcomes.  
Further, lighting and weather conditions on the road at the crash time do not appear to be 
significant factors in the severity of injury sustained from a crash. Although daylight conditions 
result in fewer crashes with minor injuries and lighted roads at night reduce fatal injuries, these 
coefficients are only significant when analyzed with one-tailed significance tests. Contrary to 
modeling distracted driving by cell phones; age, gender, and vehicle age have no significant 
impact on the outcome severity of a crash when conducting two-tailed significance tests. 
Ultimately, the variables significantly associated with crash outcome severity are different from 
those that are significantly associated with cell phone distractions reflecting the contradictions in 
previous research on the effectiveness of distracted driving policies. 
 
Discussion 
Due to the limited previous research on the effectiveness of these policies (Kwon, Yoon 
and Jang 2014, Lim and Chi 2013, Farmer, Braitman and Lund 2010) the Governor’s Highway 
Safety Association has encouraged states to wait for evidence of effectiveness before adopting 
cell phone bans (GHSA 2011). The goal of this study was to examine the effectiveness of three 
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distracted driving policies. Results from logit and multinomial logit models provide empirical 
support for policies that completely restrict cell phone usage for drivers operating a vehicle. 
Policies that restrict texting and teen usage are not effectively solving the hazards of distracted 
driving on public roads in the United States. Restricting teenagers, from using cell phones while 
driving, actually increases the occurrence of distracted driving. These findings are consistent 
with previous research (Goodwin, O'Brien and Foss 2012), where complete restrictions on 
teenagers have not produced long-term behavioral shifts in the targeted population.  
Results for other variables are consistent with findings from previous research. Speeding 
motorists, older drivers, and front-seat passengers contribute to the distractions experienced by 
drivers (Johnson, et al. 2004). Gender is a contributing factor for drivers distracted by cell 
phones. The results presented here cannot support Briem and Hedman’s (1995) finding that 
males to exhibit better vehicle control for cases involving both radio and hands-free phone 
conversations. Here, males are simply less likely to be distracted by cell phones while driving 
than women. Further, consistent with Greenberg et al. (2003) younger drivers are more often 
distracted by cell phone usage. The analysis shows that exceeding the speed limit (measured by 
the real miles per hour value in excess of the limit), is revealed as a significant predictor for cell 
phone distractions. However, this coefficient is inconsistent with research finding fewer cell 
phone distractions at high speeds (Johnson, et al. 2004). 
Contrary to previous research, policies completely restricting cell phone usage for all 
drivers, significantly decreases the likelihood of sustaining minor-, incapacitating-, and fatal-
injuries from vehicle crashes. McCartt and Geary (2004) did not find a statistical significant 
difference in usage before and after New York passed its complete cell phone usage ban. 
Although this study relies on cross-sectional longitudinal data from all 50 states, the District of 
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Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, effects of policies completely banning cell phone 
usage may vary within one specific state. Results from different research designs are not directly 
comparable and speaks to the greater lack of consistent, yet limited research on the effectiveness 
of distracted driving policies. 
 
Conclusion 
 Distracted driving poses a great danger to public safety on US roads and highways. 
However, there is limited empirical evidence examining the effectiveness of these policies. This 
project takes advantage cross-sectional FARS data when examining the effectiveness of three 
distracted driving policies. Findings indicate that policies restricting young drivers from using 
hand-held devices while driving are ineffective at reducing distracted driving occurrences. Also, 
the relationship between policies restricting texting while driving and distracted driving and 
crash outcomes is not significant. Only policies completely restricting hand-held device usage 
for all drivers are effective at reducing harmful crash outcomes. This study provides empirical 
evidence supporting the effectiveness of one policy over others when the aim is to reduce 
distracted driving and the seriousness of crash outcomes.  
Although these results are strong, more research is needed that include contextual 
variables that may or may not influence policy effectiveness at subnational levels. Effects of 
policies completely banning cell phone usage may vary within one specific state. Results from 
different research designs are not directly comparable and speaks to the greater lack of 
consistent, yet limited research on the effectiveness of distracted driving policies. Findings from 
this cross-sectional study contradict previous research employing a case study model. More 
research is needed to determine contextual factors that may influence the effectiveness of 
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distracted driving policies. Interestingly, findings in this chapter indicate that policies banning 
novice drivers from using cell phones, are ineffective at reducing the frequency of cell phone 
based distracted driving. Although consistent with previous research, a thorough examination is 
needed to determine the underlying impact of these policies on the frequency of distracted 
driving caused by cell phone usage. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusion 
 Providing feedback on policy effectiveness, by analyzing the consequences of policy 
shifts, is an important yet understudied aspect of the policy process. Many studies have examined 
policy- identification, formulation, passage, and implementation but fall short when it comes to 
addressing the effects of these policies. Theories have been developed based on insight from 
these studies yet only pay marginal attention to evaluating the effectiveness of implemented 
policies. Sabatier and Weible (2007), Baumgartner and Jones (1993), and Berry and Berry 
(1990) have extensively contributed to our theoretical understanding of how coalitions influence 
policymaking, how policy changes incrementally over time, and how/why states adopt new 
policies, respectively. While these approaches are large developments on how we explain policy 
change they do not place emphasis on the ‘backend’ of the policy cycle where feedback is 
provided to determine the appropriateness or effectiveness of the policies implemented. My 
contribution with this project has been to evaluate shifts in traffic safety policies in order to 
provide statistical evidence about the effectiveness of these altered or ‘new’ policies.  
 This dissertation has examined the impact of shifts in traffic safety policies at the state 
level, and provided feedback about the effectiveness of these shifts through statistical analyses. 
Results from these analyses were then used to evaluate the effectiveness of shifting the speed 
limit in a state; upgrading to primary enforcement of seatbelt compliance; and regulations on 
distracted driving. In doing so, natural experiments are introduced to the field of research on the 
policy feedback mechanism.  
The following research questions have guided each of the three individual chapters in this 
dissertation: 
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1. How can policy analysis be a valuable tool in evaluating the effects of policy shifts?  
2. Are local enforcement officers responsive to policy shifts made at the state level?  
3. How effective are state policies aimed at reducing occurrences of distracted driving? 
 
States enjoy reserved powers to regulate highway travel by determining appropriate speed limits. 
Alterations in these regulations pose a potential hazard to state residents and non-state residents 
alike. Many commuters nationwide pass through territory controlled by states they do not reside 
in; therefore, almost all travelers in a region are at risk if increases in speed limits results in more 
fatalities and serious injuries. Municipalities derive authority from state constitutions and are 
charged with enforcing local ordinances. When local law enforcement officers (LEOs) are given 
broader authority to enforce policy compliance they are expected to increase the scope of their 
activities. However, when the state limits the weight of the penalty for non-compliance LEOs are 
able to use discretion to focus on enforcing other policies. Finally, the use of hand held devices 
has increased dramatically during the past decade and distracted driving pose a significant hazard 
to the public safety. By analyzing various policies states have adopted to combat distracted 
driving, I provide feedback on the effectiveness of these policies given the identified problem of 
distracted driving. In sum, alterations in the proposed policies will impact millions of Americans 
and may disproportionally impact the lives of many minorities. Bureaucratic implementation 
may have further shifted a policy away from its intended purpose, but adjusting policies based on 
feedback may return the policy closer to legislators’ original intent. 
 Methodologically, this project is focused around the advantages of ‘gold standard’ 
experiments, by analyzing before and after effects of naturally occurring phenomena’s. These 
reversely designed (Morgan 2013) studies increase internal validity since they closely control the 
variables of interest and exclude other interferences as the reason for observing changes in a 
dependent variable. Although many political scientists are more focused on external validity and 
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generalizability, other ‘harder’ sciences have successfully taken advantage of quasi-experiments 
for decades. For example, by studying an increase in the fast-food industry minimum wage in 
New Jersey and comparing it to Pennsylvania, that did not experience such a shift, Card and 
Krueger (1994) were able to determine that such an increase did not impact employment figures 
negatively. Or the classic example where Snow (1855) investigated the cholera pandemic in mid-
nineteenth century London by studying higher frequency of cholera downstream of a treatment 
plant found to be supplying dirty drinking water. By employing more natural experiments; also 
called “field studies” (McDermott 2002), “Nature’s or society’s experiments” (Morgan 2013), 
and “administrative experiments” (D. T. Campbell 1967/1988), the political science field could 
greatly benefit in similar ways that other disciplines have already.  
 In chapter 2 – killer speed, I analyze fatality data from Kansas Department of 
Transportation (KDOT) to determine the impact of increasing the speed limit on highways in 
Kansas. Due to the oil embargo in the early 1970s Congress adopted a National Maximum Speed 
Limit (NMSL) of 55 mph for the entire United States (Yamane and Bradshaw 2008). Although 
the national government does not have the authority to regulate highway travel in the states, it 
enticed state governments with financial incentives in exchange for compliance with the NMSL. 
In 1995, Congress repealed the NMSL thus returning control of highway travel to the states and 
many immediately increased their speed limits.  
Studies on the effect of increasing the speed limit have found a positive relationship with 
fatality figures. Ossiander and Cummings’ (2002) Poisson regression model indicates that the 
“fatal crash rate on Washington State’s rural interstates was 110% (95% CI 60-170%) higher 
after 1987, when the speed limit was raised to 65 mph, than it would have been if the speed limit 
had not been changed” (15). Similar research, typically examining the shift from 55 to 65mph, 
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reaches very similar conclusions. Balkin and Ord (2001) found that the speed limit increases, 
from 55 to 65mph, increased rural road fatalities in 19 states at statistically significant levels 
while the increase from 65 to 70mph slightly increased rural highway fatalities in 10 states but 
had no statistically significant impact on urban interstates. However, researchers have found 
contradictory relationships between speed limit increases and fatalities. When examining the 40 
states that raised the speed limit from 55 to 65mph, Lave and Elias (1997, 615) found that the 
fatality rate decreased 4.68 percent in 1987 and another 1.55 percent in 1988. States that did not 
adopt an increase in speed limits experienced no change in the fatality rate in 1987 while a 2.55 
percent decrease generally occurred the following year. 
The results from modeling the impact of increasing the speed limit on fatality figures 
reveal interesting findings. Increasing the speed limit to 75 mph, on certain roads in 2011, did 
not by itself increase the number of fatal accidents at levels of statistical significance. As travel 
speed increases the likelihood that a crash results in a fatality increases. The speed limit increase 
in 1996, from 65 to 70mph, did not result in a greater number of fatal accidents on the interstates 
throughout Kansas. The results from modeling the impact on injury accidents reveal a different 
relationship than the one found between fatalities and the speed limit increase. Both the policy 
shift and the travel speed are positively related with serious injury figures for the 2011 and 1996 
speed limit increases. These results indicate a redirecting of traffic and a change in crash 
outcomes. 
By increasing the speed limit on Kansas highways in 2011 state lawmakers increased the 
number of serious injuries sustained in vehicle crashes, but not the number of fatalities. This shift 
in the speed limit only applied to four-lane divided highways and may have altered traffic 
patterns. Vehicles traveling in the same direction on divided roads are at reduced likelihood of 
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being involved in head-on crashes. Increasing the speed limit in 1996 actually reduced the 
number of fatal crashes. This policy shift applied to all Kansas roads and opens the possibility 
for a redirection of traffic albeit different than for 2011. However, the results from both shifts in 
the speed limit clearly show that higher levels of speed kills. Speed shows up repeatedly as a 
significant predictor of traffic fatalities. This finding is consistent across all the models examined 
but at varying levels of significance. 
 In chapter 3 – primary seatbelt enforcement, I analyze citation data from five cities in 
Kansas to determine the effects of shifting from secondary enforcement of seat-belt laws to 
primary enforcement. In essence, this upgrade to primary enforcement acts as a reduction in the 
restraints on how local law enforcement officers exercise their authority; they are able to commit 
vehicle stops for the sole reason that occupants are not wearing seatbelt (Houston and 
Richardson 2006). Lawmakers send a signal to enforcement officers to prioritize seat-belt 
violations when upgrading to primary enforcement laws that may result in police officers issuing 
an increased number of citations (Russell, Dreyfuss and Cosgrove 1999). Additionally, I analyze 
this data over time to determine the effect of state legislators capping the fine for seatbelt 
violations at $10. At this fine-ceiling, cities are not even able to cover the cost of issuing this 
type of tickets.  
 The type of enforcement has a substantial effect on seat-belt compliance rates. 
Researchers have found that in states with mandated primary enforcement of seatbelt policies 
compliance tends to be higher (Shults, et al. 2004, Dinh-Zarr, et al. 2001). “Switching from 
secondary to primary enforcement increases the [seat-belt] usage by about 13 percentage points” 
(Cohen and Einav 2003, 839). Therefore, the federal government has urged states with only 
secondary enforcement laws to upgrade to primary enforcement of seat-belt laws (NHTSA 2004, 
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1995). However, few studies actually consider the impact primary enforcement of seat-belt laws 
has on the number of fatalities (Houston and Richardson 2006). Both primary and secondary 
enforcement of seat-belt laws experience a negative relationship with the levels of road fatalities, 
although secondary enforcement reduces fatalities at roughly half the rate of primary 
enforcement (Houston and Richardson 2004, 652) or even less than half as effective in some 
studies (Dee 2001, 120). Thus, increased compliance should lead to safer roads and subsequently 
reduce fatal and serious injury accidents. 
 The results of the two models indicate that local law enforcement officers (LEOs) are 
quite responsive when state legislators change the parameters of their enforcement efforts. 
Upgrading to primary enforcement of seatbelt ordinances produces an increase in the number of 
citations issued by officers in the five Kansas cities examined. This relationship is statistically 
significant and for the city sample examined, means an increase of roughly 65 citations for 
seatbelt violations, per year as a result of upgrading to primary enforcement. Further, when state 
legislators imposed a $10 ceiling on citations for seatbelt violations, LEOs use their discretion to 
shift enforcement efforts. The $10 uniform fine for violating the seat-belt law imposed by state 
legislators in mid-summer 2011 enjoys a significant and negative relationship with the seat-belt 
citation ratio. Following the state passage of this legislation local law enforcement officers are 
relying in their professional discretion to focus their attention on enforcing other laws. Officers 
may make individual decisions that enforcing seat-belt violations are not cost effective resulting 
in lower enforcement or officers may be instructed to focus more on more cost-effective types of 
criminal activity by their supervisors. Even though the data does not distinguish between 
individual or hierarchical discretion the results show that some form of discretion exists on the 
enforcement level of seatbelt non-compliance.  
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 By uniformly setting the fine arbitrarily low local enforcement of seat-belt compliance 
was negatively affected. Municipal agents were able to reduce enforcement through discretion, 
and it is clear from the data that cities have not encouraged maintaining high enforcement from 
their police officers. When cities are only able to collect $10 for seatbelt citations they are unable 
to cover the cost of enforcing this law and direct their enforcement efforts elsewhere. Cities with 
managers are much more likely to employ this cost-benefit analysis of enforcement efforts. 
Cities led by elected officials, mayors, are seen as providing some minimum level of 
enforcement despite the marginal revenue collected from issuing these citations. This analysis 
has revealed the effects of shifting these two policies; upgrading to primary seatbelt enforcement 
reduces the threshold needed for officers to conduct vehicle stops while implementing a fine 
ceiling for these citations reduces the effort local LEOs dedicate to enforcing this type of 
unwanted behavior. 
 In chapter 4 – distracted driving, I analyze Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) 
data from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) to determine the 
effectiveness of three distracted driving policies at the state level. Every year thousands of 
people are injured and killed in crashes on public roads in the United States. 424,000 injuries and 
3,150 fatalities were caused by distractive driving in 2013 (US Department of Transportation 
2015). States have implemented various policies to combat the rising threat of distracted driving, 
yet the academic community has provided little research on the effectiveness of these policies. 
Much research of the research that has been carried out is technical in nature, either from 
laboratory simulations or observational, connecting distractions to a reduction in driving 
performance (Wilson, et al. 2010). Among the limited research on the effectiveness of policies 
aimed at reducing distracted driving are studies examining the effectiveness of banning novice 
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drivers from using cellphones while driving (Goodwin, O'Brien and Foss 2012); research 
examining the effectiveness of Graduated driver licensing (GDL) (Lim and Chi 2013); 
scholarship examining the effectiveness of total cell phone bans on usage (McCartt and Geary 
2004), and fatality and injury figures (Nikolaev, Robbins and Jacobson 2010). Insurance claims 
have also been studied to identify any changes in the trend of claims submitted from distracted 
driving crashes (HLDI 2009). Findings such as these indicate that previous research on the 
effectiveness of distracted driving policies has focused either on cell phone usage or fatal crash 
outcomes. Therefore, in this study both cell phone usage and crash outcomes were modeled to 
provide statistical support for the effectiveness of state policies in reducing usage and fatalities.   
 The results from analyzing roughly 300,000 observations from the FARS dataset indicate 
that only complete bans on cell phone usage are effective at reducing all types of crash 
outcomes. Policies restricting novice drivers from using cell phones and policies restricting 
texting while driving are ineffective at reducing the seriousness of crash outcomes. Actually, 
state policies banning teens/novice driver cell phone usage is associated with higher occurrence 
of distracted driving caused by cell phone usage! This is a clear message that simply enacting 
these types of policies will not solve the problem of distracted driving. A complete usage ban 
followed by public awareness campaign and rigorous enforcement is the most effective policy 
when seeking to reduce the bodily-harm produced by distracted driving. 
 Little research has been conducted examining the effectiveness of state policies aimed at 
reducing the negative outcomes of distractive driving. For this reason, the Governor’s Highway 
Safety Association has encouraged states to wait with adopting these types of policies until more 
research has been undertaken (GHSA 2011). The goal of this study was to examine the 
effectiveness of three distracted driving policies. Results from logit and multinomial logit models 
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provide empirical support for policies that completely restrict cell phone usage for drivers 
operating a vehicle. Policies that restrict texting and teen usage are ineffective at solving the 
hazards of distracted driving on public roads in the United States. Banning teenagers, from using 
cell phones while driving, is actually associated with an increase in the occurrence of distracted 
driving. These findings are consistent with previous research (Goodwin, O'Brien and Foss 2012), 
where complete restrictions on teenagers have not produced long-term behavioral shifts in the 
targeted population. Contrary to previous research, on the effectiveness of policies completely 
restricting cell phone usage while driving, the analysis in this study finds a significant and 
negative relationship between this policy and the three harmful crash outcomes. McCartt and 
Geary (2004) did not find a statistical significant difference in usage before and after New York 
passed its complete cell phone usage ban. My study is arguably more generalizable then research 
examining policy effects in a single state. I have relied on a cross-sectional dataset that 
encompasses all 50 U.S. states in addition to the District of Columbia, and the territories of 
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands. Roughly 300,000 observations over a three year period were 
analyzed and the results provide statistical support only for policies that completely ban cell 
phone usage while driving. Although these policies are effective at reducing the negative 
outcomes of distracted driving, many states have yet to implement similar policies. In 2012, only 
twelve states have completely banned hand-held cell phone usage for all types of drivers. Other, 
ineffective policies, such as texting bans and restrictions on teen cell usage are popular around 
the country which might reflect the difficulty of implementing the most restrictive type of 
distracted driving policies. 
In summation, I have several goals in this project, but ultimately I wanted to show the 
usefulness of employing natural experiments to the field of policy studies. Research designed 
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around this approach is able to rely on the ‘gold standard’ of experiments. The strength of 
internal validity is beneficial when determining the causal relationship between variables. 
However, external validity is less clear, especially when conducting case studies. Two of the 
three substantive chapters in this project are focused around policy shifts in the state of Kansas 
and may be less applicable to states with considerably different demographics, political 
environment, and infrastructure needs. I was able to combine the strength of experiments’ 
internal validity with external validity when examining distracted driving policies in all 50 states.  
Findings from this chapter are more generalizable to other states and provide statistical support 
for the effectiveness of complete cell phone bans over other distracted driving policies. Focusing 
this project on shifts in various traffic safety policies expand our understanding of the important 
variables at play within this field of research. If my findings can be extended to other policy 
fields remain to be seen. 
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